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Last Wednesday Defence Minister Peter MacKay was in Halifax, along with Public Works and Government Services Minister Rona Ambrose, to trumpet a major shipbuilding contract. The price tag alone — approximately $2.6 billion for two new Joint Support Ships (JSS) — should have been cause for celebration among Canada’s long-suffering shipyards.
However, no matter how hard MacKay blew his well-worn vuvuzela, he failed to get a rise out of the deservedly cynical defence industry crowd. Perhaps, like the vuvuzela itself, one can only hear the same tuneless note so often before it goes from mildly amusing to unbearably irritating.
In order to get some perspective let’s rewind the clock to the early 1990s when this project first got underway.
At that juncture Canada’s navy maintained three auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessels — the HMC Ships Protecteur, Preserver and Provider. The role of the AORs was to enable small task forces of frigates and destroyers to remain at sea for longer durations. The rationale for having three of these in the fleet was to have at least one supply ship operating on each coast while the third rotated through routine refits in the dry dock. At that time, it was projected that HMCS Provider would be scrapped by 1998 due to her advanced age. And although they were five years younger, Protecteur and Preserver would also need replacing eventually.
Recognizing this necessity, in February 1993 MIL Systems submitted an unsolicited proposal to National Defence to build two of their independently designed strategic multi-role aid and replenishment transport (SMART) ships. These SMART vessels were to augment the AORs and, essentially, were also to provide the same types of support as the current JSS project. Their displacement was to be approximately 18,800 tons, they were to have a permanent crew of 81 sailors with the capacity to transport 600 troops with their vehicles, plus operate a large hospital ward and house a four-helicopter detachment.
One of the most forward-thinking design innovations of the SMART ship was its integral capability to contain and collect oil spills. Most importantly, the price tag per ship was only about $300 million and the two SMART ships would have been fully operational by 1996.
In rejecting the offer DND claimed that the SMART ships were “too big” for the navy’s need and, besides, they were not in the environmental protection business.
Fast-forward to April 2004, when Paul Martin’s Liberal government made the first announcement that the navy was to purchase a total of three JSS plus a large amphibious vessel to facilitate the landing and support of ground forces. Two years later, the newly elected Conservative government restated the intent to purchase three 28,000-ton JSS at a price of $700 million per ship and a further $800 million over 20 years of service life support.
Gone from the equation was any mention of the amphibious ship, but Canadians were told that this $2.9 billion investment was an “infusion of opportunity into Canada’s shipbuilding industry [which will mean] the creation of high-quality jobs and the fostering of industrial development which will, in turn, contribute to a stronger Canadian economy.”
Things initially moved fairly quickly as the original four consortiums opting to bid on this project were whittled down to just two by November 2006. Thyssen-Krupp Marine and SNC-Lavalin Profac were each paid $12.5 million to develop designs and submit bids by the summer of 2008.
That is when things went horribly wrong as one bidder offered to build just two JSS for the budgeted price, while the other offered to build all three but at a much higher price. Rather than make a decision, the Harper government instead decided not to decide, and aborted the procurement process.
With last week’s announcement about restarting the project, it is clear now that the navy will have to make do with just two JSS. While the overall price tag has dropped from $2.9 billion to $2.6 billion, one needs to factor in that with just two instead of three ships, a 20-year life service support would be reduced by one third, and the $300 million in “savings” comes from a reduction in support costs for fewer ships. In other words, we are now a further two years behind schedule and Canada will be buying just two ships for the original price of three.
The operational shortfall of having only two supply ships was clearly illustrated last February during the earthquake relief efforts to Haiti. With HMCS Protecteur in for a one-year refit, Canada had to send a frigate and a destroyer — along with a civilian chartered freighter — to perform tasks far better suited to a multipurpose supply ship.
So, to recap, the most recent JSS announcement is the third time the government has declared their intention to kick-start the shipbuilding industry. Since the first in 2004, the overall price tag has decreased by $300 million, the number of ships to be built has been reduced by one third, six years have lapsed, and not a job has been created.
Is it any wonder that Peter MacKay’s vuvuzela is hitting a sour note?
 Last Wednesday Defence Minister Peter MacKay was in Halifax, along with Public Works and Government Services Minister Rona Ambrose, to trumpet a major shipbuilding contract. The price tag alone — approximately $2.6 billion for two new Joint Support Ships (JSS) — should have been cause for celebration among Canada’s long-suffering shipyards. However, no matter how hard MacKay blew his well-worn vuvuzela, he failed to get a rise out of the deservedly cynical defence industry crowd. Perhaps, like the vuvuzela itself, one can only hear the same tuneless note so often before it goes from mildly amusing to unbearably irritating.
In order to get some perspective let’s rewind the clock to the early 1990s when this project first got underway.
At that juncture Canada’s navy maintained three auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessels — the HMC Ships Protecteur, Preserver and Provider. The role of the AORs was to enable small task forces of frigates and destroyers to remain at sea for longer durations. The rationale for having three of these in the fleet was to have at least one supply ship operating on each coast while the third rotated through routine refits in the dry dock. At that time, it was projected that HMCS Provider would be scrapped by 1998 due to her advanced age. And although they were five years younger, Protecteur and Preserver would also need replacing eventually.
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