Personnel
Military spin doctors tout task force exploits PDF
Military spin doctors tout task force exploits
By Scott Taylor
September 26, 2005
Last week, the public affairs officers had good reason to pop the champagne corks and engage in a hearty round of mutual back-patting. Not often do these trained spin doctors pull off such a complete bamboozling of the press corps as this latest caper, wherein they orchestrated a non-story into four days of national coverage.
The subject matter was admittedly the intriguing activities of Canada's secret commandos, the Joint Task Force 2. To heighten the anticipation for a major announcement, "anonymous military sources" leaked some partial information to a Canadian Press reporter.
A "scoop" tends to trump factual details in the media game, so despite having only some vague non-statistics from unattributed sources, the story went to print Sept. 17.
The message that the Defence Department wanted to put into the public arena was that the JTF-2 commandos have killed and captured Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan. While noting that the combined American and coalition forces have accounted for the deaths of some 1,200 insurgents to date, the Canadian Press story hinted that the JTF-2 kill total "could be dozens."
Because no one is prepared to give an official statement or actual
data, that number could also be zero.
And given that the same reports claimed the JTF-2 consisted of "up to 1,000" commandos, when the unit's actual strength is closer to 400, should give readers a measure of the exaggeration.
In detailing the JTF-2's role in the war against terror, the CP piece also perpetuated the myth that this unit received a U.S. Presidential Citation for its participation in Task Force KBAR in 2001 and 2002. To be fair, this particular exaggeration has been carefully cultivated - and uncorrected by the Defence Department itself. The truth is that the citation was awarded to the entire coalition of special forces who participated in that mission, which happened to include just 40 of our commandos. The Joint Task Force 2 as a unit did not earn this honour.
There was also mention in the CP story of the secrecy that surrounds the activities of the "Ottawa area based" Joint Task Force 2.
Unfortunately for those public affairs officers who wish it were otherwise, the location of the home base of JTF-2 at the corner of Dwyer Hill and Franktown Road is hardly a national secret.
Thanks to a well-publicized legal dispute with a neighbouring farmer, our commandos' "secret" hideout is well-known to everyone in the national capital area.
One can't imagine old Bruce Wayne being so dumb as to go to court with his neighbour to expand the bat cave. But I digress.
By pumping out the non-story about the unconfirmed, secret and successful mission of JTF-2 in Afghanistan, the Canadian Press reporter played completely into the hands of his DND "sources." To further whet the appetite of the rest of the media, the story closed with a note that the Defence Department would provide "a few more details" at a news conference on Sept. 20.
Based on the pre-event hype - "up to 1,000" secret commandos killing "up to dozens" of al-Qaida, the Sept. 20 briefing was well-attended by an eager crowd of reporters - all anxious to receive their promised "few more details."
Instead, the scene played out like the old Peanuts cartoon scenario where Lucy pulls away the football at the last minute, and Charlie Brown ends up kicking empty air.
Brig.-Gen. Mike Ward (no relation to Burt Ward, the actor who played Batman's sidekick Robin) gave a series of "no comments," neither confirming nor denying the previous leaked story.
What did we learn from Ward's announcement? Apparently, JTF-2 commandos have been involved in operations and "have not suffered any casualties. Casualties have occurred on the other side." Case closed.
No numbers, no details on enemy killed, and nothing but evasive answers on how JTF-2 captives are handed over to U.S. authorities.
The Americans acknowledged that Taliban are considered "unlawful combatants" and therefore not entitled to the protection of the
Geneva Convention.
However, Brig.-Gen. Ward claims that those guerrillas captured by
Canadian commandos and handed over to the U.S. are somehow guaranteed "humane treatment."
How exactly Brig.-Gen. Ward can guarantee that the Geneva Convention rules are applied once prisoners are out of our control is a story worth pursuing.
Publishing unsubstantiated, unconfirmed, whispered death tolls is not just bad journalism, it is manipulative propaganda.

Last week, the public affairs officers had good reason to pop the champagne corks and engage in a hearty round of mutual back-patting. Not often do these trained spin doctors pull off such a complete bamboozling of the press corps as this latest caper, wherein they orchestrated a non-story into four days of national coverage. The subject matter was admittedly the intriguing activities of Canada's secret commandos, the Joint Task Force 2. To heighten the anticipation for a major announcement, "anonymous military sources" leaked some partial information to a Canadian Press reporter.

A "scoop" tends to trump factual details in the media game, so despite having only some vague non-statistics from unattributed sources, the story went to print Sept. 17. The message that the Defence Department wanted to put into the public arena was that the JTF-2 commandos have killed and captured Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan. While noting that the combined American and coalition forces have accounted for the deaths of some 1,200 insurgents to date, the Canadian Press story hinted that the JTF-2 kill total "could be dozens." Because no one is prepared to give an official statement or actual data, that number could also be zero.

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Alexander the Great has lesson for Hillier PDF
Alexander the Great has lesson for Hillier
By Scott Taylor
August 29, 2005
It has been seven months since Gen. Rick Hillier was appointed Canada's chief of defense staff, and he is still out making the rounds on the media circuit discussing his vision for a revitalized military.
Since his inauguration, Hillier has been singularly well-received by journalists, pundits, analysts and serving members who appreciate the tough-talking Newfoundlander's straightforward approach. For instance, in announcing our army's latest deployment to Afghanistan, Hillier prepared the Canadian public to expect casualties as our troops take on a more combat-oriented role in the dangerous Kandahar region.
Instead of being questioned about our contingent's combat preparedness for such a mission and about the rationale behind this policy shift, Hillier drew thunderous applause for denouncing the enemy combatants as scumbags and murderers.
The thrust of Hillier's message was for Canadians to hug it up and get used to the fact that war fighting is not for the faint-hearted. No argument with that. What the chief of defense staff must do now is persuade his political masters that while our troops are facing these wartime risks, the corrupted, incompetent and woefully backlogged procurement system cannot continue to idle along at the present pace.
At a morale-boosting speech to service members in Moose Jaw, Sask., recently, even Defense Minister Bill Graham admitted the present situation is unworkable. One of the problems of procurement in the military is that it takes too long, he said. To emphasize this understatement, he explained that the average military acquisition of any significance in this country takes 12 years. Graham did vow to his Moose Jaw audience to cut that time back, but similar hollow claims have been made repeatedly in the past.
In August 1999, when Alan Williams was appointed assistant deputy minister (materiel), he made it his personal objective to reduce the Defense Department's procurement time frame by no less than 30 per cent. But when Williams left that post earlier this year, industry insiders admitted that the average purchase schedule had actually increased by as much as 50 per cent.
To be fair, part of this discrepancy is a result of the ongoing Adscam kickback scandal, which has necessitated a battery of reviews, audits and direct top-level sign-off on even the most routine of purchases. But the very notion that an equipment purchase takes an average of 12 years needs to be put into perspective.
Over the past 12 years, Canada has had no fewer than nine defence ministers and seven chiefs of defence staff. With government white papers being drafted in 1987, 1994 and 2005, the trend has been to rewrite our defence policy every seven to 11 years, which is notably less time than the average equipment purchase. Coincidence?
Historically, when Canada mobilized for war, the political will and prompt dedication of resources galvanized domestic industry to meet the challenge. The Second World War lasted less than six years, and during that time frame we recruited, equipped and trained nearly a million military personnel. In terms of technological advances, our air force went from flying biplanes to jets.
Of course, not all of the weaponry produced was first class and there were numerous glitches to iron out, often with dire results on the battlefield. But the time frame in which this supply challenge was met sorely undermines the current Defense Department bureaucratic battle cry that these things take time!
For a more current example of the old axiom Where there's a will, there's a way, one need only look at the U.S. example on Iraq. Since its virtually unopposed intervention devolved into a bloody insurgency in the summer of 2003, the American military has designed, tested and built new armoured truck cabs and retrofitted all of its support vehicles in theatre, providing soldiers with better protection against roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades. In contrast, Canada's entire fleet of 24-year-old army trucks has been overdue for replacement since 2001.
The government has yet to officially start even the bidding process on a contract that is not expected to begin delivering vehicles until 2008. But I digress. After decades of accumulated bureaucratic redundancy, the defence procurement system has long since forgotten that its primary function is to support combat operations. If Gen. Hillier is sincere about implementing his reforms, he must take a page out of Alexander the Great's playbook.
In 333 BC, when the young Macedonian king was presented with the challenge of untying a massive tangle of ropes known as the Gordian knot, he simply drew out his sword and cut through the bonds. The attendant academics and scholars who had previously tried and failed to unravel the complex knot claimed his approach violated the rules. But Alexander nevertheless solved the problem.
With only a four-year stint as CDS, and procurement stalled at an average of 12 years per purchase, Hillier does not have the option of fiddling about untying an unending pile of red tape. At least not while our troops are deployed in harm's way.
It has been seven months since Gen. Rick Hillier was appointed Canada's chief of defense staff, and he is still out making the rounds on the media circuit discussing his vision for a revitalized military.
Since his inauguration, Hillier has been singularly well-received by journalists, pundits, analysts and serving members who appreciate the tough-talking Newfoundlander's straightforward approach. For instance, in announcing our army's latest deployment to Afghanistan, Hillier prepared the Canadian public to expect casualties as our troops take on a more combat-oriented role in the dangerous Kandahar region.
Instead of being questioned about our contingent's combat preparedness for such a mission and about the rationale behind this policy shift, Hillier drew thunderous applause for denouncing the enemy combatants as scumbags and murderers.
The thrust of Hillier's message was for Canadians to hug it up and get used to the fact that war fighting is not for the faint-hearted. No argument with that. What the chief of defense staff must do now is persuade his political masters that while our troops are facing these wartime risks, the corrupted, incompetent and woefully backlogged procurement system cannot continue to idle along at the present pace.
At a morale-boosting speech to service members in Moose Jaw, Sask., recently, even Defense Minister Bill Graham admitted the present situation is unworkable. One of the problems of procurement in the military is that it takes too long, he said. To emphasize this understatement, he explained that the average military acquisition of any significance in this country takes 12 years. Graham did vow to his Moose Jaw audience to cut that time back, but similar hollow claims have been made repeatedly in the past.
In August 1999, when Alan Williams was appointed assistant deputy minister (materiel), he made it his personal objective to reduce the Defense Department's procurement time frame by no less than 30 per cent. But when Williams left that post earlier this year, industry insiders admitted that the average purchase schedule had actually increased by as much as 50 per cent.
To be fair, part of this discrepancy is a result of the ongoing Adscam kickback scandal, which has necessitated a battery of reviews, audits and direct top-level sign-off on even the most routine of purchases. But the very notion that an equipment purchase takes an average of 12 years needs to be put into perspective.
Over the past 12 years, Canada has had no fewer than nine defence ministers and seven chiefs of defence staff. With government white papers being drafted in 1987, 1994 and 2005, the trend has been to rewrite our defence policy every seven to 11 years, which is notably less time than the average equipment purchase. Coincidence?
Historically, when Canada mobilized for war, the political will and prompt dedication of resources galvanized domestic industry to meet the challenge. The Second World War lasted less than six years, and during that time frame we recruited, equipped and trained nearly a million military personnel. In terms of technological advances, our air force went from flying biplanes to jets.
Of course, not all of the weaponry produced was first class and there were numerous glitches to iron out, often with dire results on the battlefield. But the time frame in which this supply challenge was met sorely undermines the current Defense Department bureaucratic battle cry that these things take time!
For a more current example of the old axiom Where there's a will, there's a way, one need only look at the U.S. example on Iraq. Since its virtually unopposed intervention devolved into a bloody insurgency in the summer of 2003, the American military has designed, tested and built new armoured truck cabs and retrofitted all of its support vehicles in theatre, providing soldiers with better protection against roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades. In contrast, Canada's entire fleet of 24-year-old army trucks has been overdue for replacement since 2001.
The government has yet to officially start even the bidding process on a contract that is not expected to begin delivering vehicles until 2008. But I digress. After decades of accumulated bureaucratic redundancy, the defence procurement system has long since forgotten that its primary function is to support combat operations. If Gen. Hillier is sincere about implementing his reforms, he must take a page out of Alexander the Great's playbook.
In 333 BC, when the young Macedonian king was presented with the challenge of untying a massive tangle of ropes known as the Gordian knot, he simply drew out his sword and cut through the bonds. The attendant academics and scholars who had previously tried and failed to unravel the complex knot claimed his approach violated the rules. But Alexander nevertheless solved the problem.
With only a four-year stint as CDS, and procurement stalled at an average of 12 years per purchase, Hillier does not have the option of fiddling about untying an unending pile of red tape. At least not while our troops are deployed in harm's way.
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Military's concern over HIV on base legitimate PDF
Military's concern over HIV on base legitimate
By Scott Taylor
March 27, 2005
THE BIGGEST military story circulating in the Canadian media last week was the bizarre case of Jennifer Murphy. The 31-year-old Newfoundland native had allegedly been targeting soldiers at Canadian Forces Base Borden with offers of casual sex.
When it was discovered that Murphy (a.k.a. Lucy-Lou) is in fact HIV-positive, the military police stepped in to make an arrest. Lucy-Lou, who is not a member of the Canadian Forces, is accused of preying upon men in the married quarters and in the men's barracks at the Ontario base.
"As the incidents (allegedly) took place on DND property, the (military) National Investigative Service had the jurisdiction to lay charges," said Capt. Mark Giles, a spokesman for the service.
Charged with aggravated assault for allegedly engaging in unprotected sex without informing a partner that she was HIV-positive, Lucy-Lou is now being held without bail in a civilian detention centre and will be prosecuted by the provincial Crown attorney, not the military's Judge Advocate General.
Soldiers questioned at CFB Borden allege the woman, five feet tall and 130 pounds, often dressed in fishnet stockings, go-go boots and midriff-baring tank tops, would approach soldiers over drinks at a nightclub and ask if they "would like to party."
On some nights, they say, she was even more direct, taking a taxi to the men's barracks where she would knock on doors and offer sex to the occupants.
Only one soldier has thus far filed a formal complaint to the National Investigative Service, but it's not known how many others might have taken up her offer.
Since arriving in the CFB Borden area in early February, Lucy-Lou's fashion sense and public displays in local bars certainly caught every-
one's attention. One female soldier admitted to reporters that Lucy-Lou was "a partier, to put it mildly."
Another civilian was slightly more judgmental.
"We all thought she was a hooker," said one local mall employee.
The original charges were filed on March 2 but, although the National Investigative Service did notify the Borden media, the story did not break nationally until March 22.
Once the case made the headlines, it did not take long for reporters to begin assembling an in-depth profile of Murphy.
It turns out that she had been victimized by a sex partner who knowingly exposed her to HIV back in 1992. Then an 18-year-old single mother, Murphy took her "assaulter" to court. Although a reprimand of sorts was issued to the defendant, the case was eventually dismissed on the basis that Murphy had subsequently had sexual relations with other partners and could not conclusively prove the source of her infection.
Somehow the military's investigative service failed to uncover these facts during their weeks of sleuthing and only learned of Murphy's HIV history by reading about it in the newspaper. But I digress.
I must admit that the military's handling of this particular incident has been a refreshing change from its normal practice of covering up sex scandals. (Who can forget the embarrassing revelations about co-ed recruit hijinks at CFB Kingston that involved, among other things, sex with a blow-up sheep doll named Betty? Or the red-faced admissions of the senior brass when it was discovered that officer cadets were making porn films at the military college?)
Given that, so far, only one potential victim is alleged to have had unprotected sex with Lucy-Lou, and that the incident rate of female-to-male transmission for HIV from a single exposure is listed at one in 100 to one in 1,000, one could suggest that the investigative service is overreacting with its widespread health alert. However, the military knows its own statistics.
Back in 1991, during the trials conducted for Combat Related Employment for Women, seven female recruits were housed in supervised barracks with some 200 artillery recruits. But when a single case of chlamydia was discovered, the routine medical questions were asked. Eventually it was revealed that more than 40 soldiers - both men and women - had been infected with the same strain of sexually transmitted disease. One female alone accounted for more than two dozen infections among her comrades over a three-month training course.
With HIV thrown into such an environment, you can suddenly understand the military's concern for the welfare of its personnel. This case should also send a strong message to those recruits who failed to listen to the age-old army adage: "Don't be silly, wrap that willy!"
THE BIGGEST military story circulating in the Canadian media last week was the bizarre case of Jennifer Murphy. The 31-year-old Newfoundland native had allegedly been targeting soldiers at Canadian Forces Base Borden with offers of casual sex.
When it was discovered that Murphy (a.k.a. Lucy-Lou) is in fact HIV-positive, the military police stepped in to make an arrest. Lucy-Lou, who is not a member of the Canadian Forces, is accused of preying upon men in the married quarters and in the men's barracks at the Ontario base.
"As the incidents (allegedly) took place on DND property, the (military) National Investigative Service had the jurisdiction to lay charges," said Capt. Mark Giles, a spokesman for the service.
Charged with aggravated assault for allegedly engaging in unprotected sex without informing a partner that she was HIV-positive, Lucy-Lou is now being held without bail in a civilian detention centre and will be prosecuted by the provincial Crown attorney, not the military's Judge Advocate General.
Soldiers questioned at CFB Borden allege the woman, five feet tall and 130 pounds, often dressed in fishnet stockings, go-go boots and midriff-baring tank tops, would approach soldiers over drinks at a nightclub and ask if they "would like to party."
On some nights, they say, she was even more direct, taking a taxi to the men's barracks where she would knock on doors and offer sex to the occupants.
Only one soldier has thus far filed a formal complaint to the National Investigative Service, but it's not known how many others might have taken up her offer.
Since arriving in the CFB Borden area in early February, Lucy-Lou's fashion sense and public displays in local bars certainly caught every-
one's attention. One female soldier admitted to reporters that Lucy-Lou was "a partier, to put it mildly."
Another civilian was slightly more judgmental.
"We all thought she was a hooker," said one local mall employee.
The original charges were filed on March 2 but, although the National Investigative Service did notify the Borden media, the story did not break nationally until March 22.
Once the case made the headlines, it did not take long for reporters to begin assembling an in-depth profile of Murphy.
It turns out that she had been victimized by a sex partner who knowingly exposed her to HIV back in 1992. Then an 18-year-old single mother, Murphy took her "assaulter" to court. Although a reprimand of sorts was issued to the defendant, the case was eventually dismissed on the basis that Murphy had subsequently had sexual relations with other partners and could not conclusively prove the source of her infection.
Somehow the military's investigative service failed to uncover these facts during their weeks of sleuthing and only learned of Murphy's HIV history by reading about it in the newspaper. But I digress.
I must admit that the military's handling of this particular incident has been a refreshing change from its normal practice of covering up sex scandals. (Who can forget the embarrassing revelations about co-ed recruit hijinks at CFB Kingston that involved, among other things, sex with a blow-up sheep doll named Betty? Or the red-faced admissions of the senior brass when it was discovered that officer cadets were making porn films at the military college?)
Given that, so far, only one potential victim is alleged to have had unprotected sex with Lucy-Lou, and that the incident rate of female-to-male transmission for HIV from a single exposure is listed at one in 100 to one in 1,000, one could suggest that the investigative service is overreacting with its widespread health alert. However, the military knows its own statistics.
Back in 1991, during the trials conducted for Combat Related Employment for Women, seven female recruits were housed in supervised barracks with some 200 artillery recruits. But when a single case of chlamydia was discovered, the routine medical questions were asked. Eventually it was revealed that more than 40 soldiers - both men and women - had been infected with the same strain of sexually transmitted disease. One female alone accounted for more than two dozen infections among her comrades over a three-month training course.
With HIV thrown into such an environment, you can suddenly understand the military's concern for the welfare of its personnel. This case should also send a strong message to those recruits who failed to listen to the age-old army adage: "Don't be silly, wrap that willy!"
Add comment
 
Female soldier drive just futile PDF
Female soldier drive just futile
By Scott Taylor
March 14, 2005
THE MILITARY recently released a couple of internal studies that indicate that women continue to feel marginalized by their male counterparts within the Canadian Forces - particularly in front-line combat units. Apparently, a large number of those Forces members polled also had difficulty accepting gays, lesbians and ethnic minorities among their ranks, while general officers were viewed with mistrust.
In response to the negative feedback, the Defence Department spin doctors immediately trotted out their usual list of confusing statistics, pie charts and hollow promises that the Canadian Forces remain committed to the policy of gender integration. What these public affairs officers count on is that nobody remembers the Defence Department's previously stated goals.
A review of the 27-year-long Canadian Forces project to integrate women into combat units reveals an exercise in abject futility.
The initial studies on redefining gender restrictions within the military were sparked by the Canadian Human Rights Act in 1978. Two years later, these studies had evolved into a program called Service Women in Non-traditional Environments and Roles which involved limited, supervised trials of female recruits in various front-line occupations. The results were less than encouraging and in some cases outright failures. But by 1989, federal human rights watchdogs were losing patience with the military, and the Forces were ordered to implement "full integration . . . with all due speed."
The federal officials, however, allowed the Defence Department a full decade to remove "all discriminating employment barriers" with the exception of service aboard submarines.
Fast-forward 10 years to 1999. The report card on the military's integration came back stamped with a giant F. Despite the removal of restrictions, and the much-publicized "success stories" of those female pioneers who had completed battle school and fighter-pilot training, there had been no followup wave of women wishing to join the Forces.
In fact, although the percentage of women in the military had increased slightly - from 9.9 per cent to 10.8 per cent over that same decade, the total troop strength had been reduced from 90,000 to 60,000. If one crunches the numbers, the lifting of barriers actually resulted in 2,430 fewer women in uniform, and most of the proportional increases had occurred in the "traditional" roles such as support trades and medical staff, not within the combat arms.
Instead of pointing out to the human rights officials that Canadian women were obviously not attracted to careers in combat trades, the brass vowed to redouble their efforts.
Former army commander and later chief of defence staff Maurice Baril vowed to increase female representation by 2009 to 25 per cent of combat units and 28 per cent of the Canadian Forces overall. To achieve this, Baril pulled out all the stops: fitness standards were "adjusted" (read, lowered) to compensate for the natural disparity in men's and women's upper-body strength; the ban on women serving in submarines was lifted; and $2.8 million and a panel of male officers were assigned to the development of a "combat bra!"
The Canadian Forces now have the lowest set of physical fitness standards of any military in the world (ever!). The media blitz generated zero interest; not one woman opted to sail on subs and the combat bra was declared a bust and cancelled.
In February's federal budget, it was announced that the Canadian Forces will recruit and train an additional 5,000 troops to flesh out the ranks of our badly under-strength military. Most of these soldiers will be earmarked for the army in general and combat arms regiments in particular.
Despite the fact that recruiters haven't been able to even keep pace with normal attrition, DND public affairs is once again heralding this as an opportunity to address the gender imbalance.
My suggestion is to quit whipping a dead horse. Instead of trying to achieve a politically driven agenda, recruiters must simply seek out the best qualified candidates - regardless of gender, sexual persuasion or ethnic background.
It is interesting to note that Canada ranks second in the world with regards to the ratio of female to male soldiers. The only country with a higher representation is the United States with 14 per cent, and they still do not allow women to serve in combat units. Go figure.
THE MILITARY recently released a couple of internal studies that indicate that women continue to feel marginalized by their male counterparts within the Canadian Forces - particularly in front-line combat units. Apparently, a large number of those Forces members polled also had difficulty accepting gays, lesbians and ethnic minorities among their ranks, while general officers were viewed with mistrust.
In response to the negative feedback, the Defence Department spin doctors immediately trotted out their usual list of confusing statistics, pie charts and hollow promises that the Canadian Forces remain committed to the policy of gender integration. What these public affairs officers count on is that nobody remembers the Defence Department's previously stated goals.
A review of the 27-year-long Canadian Forces project to integrate women into combat units reveals an exercise in abject futility.
The initial studies on redefining gender restrictions within the military were sparked by the Canadian Human Rights Act in 1978. Two years later, these studies had evolved into a program called Service Women in Non-traditional Environments and Roles which involved limited, supervised trials of female recruits in various front-line occupations. The results were less than encouraging and in some cases outright failures. But by 1989, federal human rights watchdogs were losing patience with the military, and the Forces were ordered to implement "full integration . . . with all due speed."
The federal officials, however, allowed the Defence Department a full decade to remove "all discriminating employment barriers" with the exception of service aboard submarines.
Fast-forward 10 years to 1999. The report card on the military's integration came back stamped with a giant F. Despite the removal of restrictions, and the much-publicized "success stories" of those female pioneers who had completed battle school and fighter-pilot training, there had been no followup wave of women wishing to join the Forces.
In fact, although the percentage of women in the military had increased slightly - from 9.9 per cent to 10.8 per cent over that same decade, the total troop strength had been reduced from 90,000 to 60,000. If one crunches the numbers, the lifting of barriers actually resulted in 2,430 fewer women in uniform, and most of the proportional increases had occurred in the "traditional" roles such as support trades and medical staff, not within the combat arms.
Instead of pointing out to the human rights officials that Canadian women were obviously not attracted to careers in combat trades, the brass vowed to redouble their efforts.
Former army commander and later chief of defence staff Maurice Baril vowed to increase female representation by 2009 to 25 per cent of combat units and 28 per cent of the Canadian Forces overall. To achieve this, Baril pulled out all the stops: fitness standards were "adjusted" (read, lowered) to compensate for the natural disparity in men's and women's upper-body strength; the ban on women serving in submarines was lifted; and $2.8 million and a panel of male officers were assigned to the development of a "combat bra!"
The Canadian Forces now have the lowest set of physical fitness standards of any military in the world (ever!). The media blitz generated zero interest; not one woman opted to sail on subs and the combat bra was declared a bust and cancelled.
In February's federal budget, it was announced that the Canadian Forces will recruit and train an additional 5,000 troops to flesh out the ranks of our badly under-strength military. Most of these soldiers will be earmarked for the army in general and combat arms regiments in particular.
Despite the fact that recruiters haven't been able to even keep pace with normal attrition, DND public affairs is once again heralding this as an opportunity to address the gender imbalance.
My suggestion is to quit whipping a dead horse. Instead of trying to achieve a politically driven agenda, recruiters must simply seek out the best qualified candidates - regardless of gender, sexual persuasion or ethnic background.
It is interesting to note that Canada ranks second in the world with regards to the ratio of female to male soldiers. The only country with a higher representation is the United States with 14 per cent, and they still do not allow women to serve in combat units. Go figure.
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Hostage bungle Chaos, not conspiracy PDF
Hostage bungle
Chaos, not conspiracy
By Scott Taylor
March 10, 2005
After Italian intelligence operatives had secured her release from Iraqi insurgents, journalist Giuliana Sgrena was admittedly elated, celebrating her new lease on life after a month-long hostage ordeal.
That was before US soldiers opened fire on the vehicle which carried Sgrena and her rescuers towards the Baghdad airport.
One Italian secret service agent, Nicola Calipari, was killed, while Sgrena and another intelligence official were wounded in the American fusillade.
In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, Pentagon officials said the Italian vehicle had been speeding towards their checkpoint and that the driver had failed to obey US soldiers' signals.
Following her evacuation from Iraq to Italy, veteran reporter Sgrena disputed the American version of events, stating that the vehicle that carried her to freedom was travelling at "regular speed" and that the only "signal" issued by the US troops was a burst of machine gun fire.
Writing in her own newspaper Il Manifesto, Sgrena sparked a flurry of conspiracy theories that quickly circulated around the globe.
She said prior to her release her captors warned her "to be careful, because the Americans don't want you to return" and that she should not reveal her presence to anyone because "the Americans might intervene".
There can be little doubt that the US authorities and the interim Iraqi government would be displeased over the fact that Sgrena's release was secured through a reported ransom payment of $6-8 million.
However, it is unfathomable to think that the Pentagon would have ordered a deliberate assassination of a Western reporter under such high-profile circumstances.
While the idea of the Italian government funding the insurgency and further supporting the new cottage industry of kidnapping runs counter to US policy in Iraq, in this instance the money had apparently already been paid.
In other words, there was nothing to be gained by attacking the Italian rescue vehicle.
And as events have proven, in terms of public relations and international politics, the Americans stood to lose everything by doing so since Italy is one of the few European members of US President George Bush's "coalition of the willing" with a tangible troop commitment of some 3000 soldiers in Iraq.
The attack against Sgrena has only re-ignited the strong anti-war and anti-American sentiments which existed in Italy, and Prime Minister Berlusconi will be hard-pressed by public protests to bring home the Italian contingent.
In anticipation of such a damaging blow, the US neo-cons have gone into full attack mode in a desperate attempt to discredit Sgrena's version of events.
The fact that Il Manifesto is a "communist" newspaper is reported by these Republican Party cheerleaders as though this automatically discredits the source and implies something far more sinister.
One of the most ridiculous spins on the incident is being put forward by none other than David Frum, Bush's former speech writer, who claims credit for coining the phrase "axis of evil".
[Rumsfeld's] policies have already turned all of Iraq into a deadly free-fire zone
Frum's take on the tragedy is that Sgrena's professional negligence (ie getting captured while trying to report an independent perspective on the war in Iraq) led to the unfortunate death of Nicola Calipari, a "heroic" ally of the US.
It also appears to irk Frum that the Italian government "went behind the Americans' backs" to negotiate for Sgrena's successful release.
What Frum and his colleagues fail to accept is the fact that the US has completely lost control of the security situation in Iraq and, as a result, allied governments have no choice but to take matters into their own hands to protect their nationals.
Thus far, after two years of insurgency and violence, the American military has yet to mount a single successful hostage rescue. Even the much publicised commando raid to free Private Jessica Lynch was quickly debunked as an elaborate hoax.
In an effort to cast further suspicion on Sgrena's ordeal, Jim Bartlett, a US historian and military affairs correspondent, is circulating a letter among internet bloggers asking: "What was [the Italians'] hurry?"
However, instead of insinuating something dastardly, Bartlett appears to answer his own question by asking: "After a month in captivity, in the hands of the Iraqi insurgents, [the Italians] were trying to fly her to Rome the same day she was released???"
Having endured my own hostage ordeal for five days last September, I can assure Mr Bartlett and his fellow doubters that despite my injuries and trauma I had no desire to report to the American authorities for a "physical", as he suggests Ms Sgrena should have done. Like her, my only wish was to return home as quickly as possible.
The fact that Il Manifesto is a "communist" newspaper is reported by these Republican party cheerleaders as though this automatically discredits the source and implies something far more sinister
The other "question" raised by Bartlett actually provides the only real insight into this regrettable tragedy. "In all the times that I have been on the Baghdad airport road," writes Bartlett, "I cannot imagine what that [Italian] intelligence officer was thinking taking that road at night."
The reason for this is that, in the wake of recent suicide bombings against coalition forces and Iraqi police, the Americans have once again modified their rules of engagement. All that is necessary now for US troops to legally employ deadly force is that they feel threatened in any given circumstance.
As there are very few foreigners operating outside US protected Green Zones in Iraq and even fewer travelling on the roads at night, international reports of incidents such as the Sgrena shooting have been rare.
However, for local Iraqi citizens, being gunned down by jumpy Americans has become all too common an occurrence.
Although the majority of the victims in these instances are innocent civilians, the killings are categorised as "deaths in combat".
As such, the families of the victims are deprived of any legal claim against the soldiers responsible other than to receive a one-time payment of between $1000 and $2500.
The most ironic thing about those partisan pro-American pundits' statements that challenge Sgrena's story is that the US soldiers unquestionably proved the insurgents' prophecy.
They warned her to be careful of the Americans, and they were right.
Did US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld specifically target a journalist in this instance? Absolutely not. He didn't have to, as his policies have already turned all of Iraq into a deadly free-fire zone.
[Former Canadian soldier Scott Taylor is the editor of Esprit de Corps military magazine and a veteran war correspondent. He has visited Iraq 20 times since August 2000 and is the author of Spinning on the Axis of Evil: America's War against Iraq and Among the Others: Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq. Last September he was held hostage for five days in northern Iraq by Ansar al-Islam Mujahadin]
The opinions expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position or have the endorsement of Aljazeera.
After Italian intelligence operatives had secured her release from Iraqi insurgents, journalist Giuliana Sgrena was admittedly elated, celebrating her new lease on life after a month-long hostage ordeal.
That was before US soldiers opened fire on the vehicle which carried Sgrena and her rescuers towards the Baghdad airport.
One Italian secret service agent, Nicola Calipari, was killed, while Sgrena and another intelligence official were wounded in the American fusillade.
In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, Pentagon officials said the Italian vehicle had been speeding towards their checkpoint and that the driver had failed to obey US soldiers' signals.
Following her evacuation from Iraq to Italy, veteran reporter Sgrena disputed the American version of events, stating that the vehicle that carried her to freedom was travelling at "regular speed" and that the only "signal" issued by the US troops was a burst of machine gun fire.
Writing in her own newspaper Il Manifesto, Sgrena sparked a flurry of conspiracy theories that quickly circulated around the globe.
She said prior to her release her captors warned her "to be careful, because the Americans don't want you to return" and that she should not reveal her presence to anyone because "the Americans might intervene".
There can be little doubt that the US authorities and the interim Iraqi government would be displeased over the fact that Sgrena's release was secured through a reported ransom payment of $6-8 million.
However, it is unfathomable to think that the Pentagon would have ordered a deliberate assassination of a Western reporter under such high-profile circumstances.
While the idea of the Italian government funding the insurgency and further supporting the new cottage industry of kidnapping runs counter to US policy in Iraq, in this instance the money had apparently already been paid.
In other words, there was nothing to be gained by attacking the Italian rescue vehicle.
And as events have proven, in terms of public relations and international politics, the Americans stood to lose everything by doing so since Italy is one of the few European members of US President George Bush's "coalition of the willing" with a tangible troop commitment of some 3000 soldiers in Iraq.
The attack against Sgrena has only re-ignited the strong anti-war and anti-American sentiments which existed in Italy, and Prime Minister Berlusconi will be hard-pressed by public protests to bring home the Italian contingent.
In anticipation of such a damaging blow, the US neo-cons have gone into full attack mode in a desperate attempt to discredit Sgrena's version of events.
The fact that Il Manifesto is a "communist" newspaper is reported by these Republican Party cheerleaders as though this automatically discredits the source and implies something far more sinister.
One of the most ridiculous spins on the incident is being put forward by none other than David Frum, Bush's former speech writer, who claims credit for coining the phrase "axis of evil".
[Rumsfeld's] policies have already turned all of Iraq into a deadly free-fire zone
Frum's take on the tragedy is that Sgrena's professional negligence (ie getting captured while trying to report an independent perspective on the war in Iraq) led to the unfortunate death of Nicola Calipari, a "heroic" ally of the US.
It also appears to irk Frum that the Italian government "went behind the Americans' backs" to negotiate for Sgrena's successful release.
What Frum and his colleagues fail to accept is the fact that the US has completely lost control of the security situation in Iraq and, as a result, allied governments have no choice but to take matters into their own hands to protect their nationals.
Thus far, after two years of insurgency and violence, the American military has yet to mount a single successful hostage rescue. Even the much publicised commando raid to free Private Jessica Lynch was quickly debunked as an elaborate hoax.
In an effort to cast further suspicion on Sgrena's ordeal, Jim Bartlett, a US historian and military affairs correspondent, is circulating a letter among internet bloggers asking: "What was [the Italians'] hurry?"
However, instead of insinuating something dastardly, Bartlett appears to answer his own question by asking: "After a month in captivity, in the hands of the Iraqi insurgents, [the Italians] were trying to fly her to Rome the same day she was released???"
Having endured my own hostage ordeal for five days last September, I can assure Mr Bartlett and his fellow doubters that despite my injuries and trauma I had no desire to report to the American authorities for a "physical", as he suggests Ms Sgrena should have done. Like her, my only wish was to return home as quickly as possible.
The fact that Il Manifesto is a "communist" newspaper is reported by these Republican party cheerleaders as though this automatically discredits the source and implies something far more sinister
The other "question" raised by Bartlett actually provides the only real insight into this regrettable tragedy. "In all the times that I have been on the Baghdad airport road," writes Bartlett, "I cannot imagine what that [Italian] intelligence officer was thinking taking that road at night."
The reason for this is that, in the wake of recent suicide bombings against coalition forces and Iraqi police, the Americans have once again modified their rules of engagement. All that is necessary now for US troops to legally employ deadly force is that they feel threatened in any given circumstance.
As there are very few foreigners operating outside US protected Green Zones in Iraq and even fewer travelling on the roads at night, international reports of incidents such as the Sgrena shooting have been rare.
However, for local Iraqi citizens, being gunned down by jumpy Americans has become all too common an occurrence.
Although the majority of the victims in these instances are innocent civilians, the killings are categorised as "deaths in combat".
As such, the families of the victims are deprived of any legal claim against the soldiers responsible other than to receive a one-time payment of between $1000 and $2500.
The most ironic thing about those partisan pro-American pundits' statements that challenge Sgrena's story is that the US soldiers unquestionably proved the insurgents' prophecy.
They warned her to be careful of the Americans, and they were right.
Did US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld specifically target a journalist in this instance? Absolutely not. He didn't have to, as his policies have already turned all of Iraq into a deadly free-fire zone.
[Former Canadian soldier Scott Taylor is the editor of Esprit de Corps military magazine and a veteran war correspondent. He has visited Iraq 20 times since August 2000 and is the author of Spinning on the Axis of Evil: America's War against Iraq and Among the Others: Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq. Last September he was held hostage for five days in northern Iraq by Ansar al-Islam Mujahadin]
The opinions expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position or have the endorsement of Aljazeera.
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