Canadian Military

Military not to blame for missing the unimaginable

Since I first met Colonel Michel Drapeau in the summer of 1994, I have had nothing but the utmost respect for this fine officer.

It was his insider knowledge of rampant corruption within the Department of National Defence in those days, and more importantly, Drapeau’s integrity in bringing those systemic shortfalls to the public’s attention, which resulted in many positive reforms for the Canadian Forces.

The media feeding frenzy during the Somalia Scandal in the mid-‘90s propelled Drapeau into an established position as a straight-shooting, independent military pundit.

To this day, Drapeau remains one of the most oft-quoted commentators on defence issues in the Canadian media and, I dare say, it is a rare occasion indeed that I disagree with his judgment.

However, I must admit that I found his commentary regarding Russell Williams and the military’s flawed screening process to be off the mark.

Up until this juncture, the shocking and lurid details of Williams’s sex-slaying and lingerie perversions were viewed by both civilians and military personnel alike with morbid fascination. Williams’s despicable acts were such an abomination of human behaviour that they defied categorization.

Then came the analysis from Drapeau that, in his opinion, the Canadian military needs to improve its screening process.

The immediate media uptake was that, somehow, the military had failed to protect us from this monster. Instead of holding Williams responsible for his heinous crimes as an individual Canadian, it was now the Canadian Forces as an institution that was being scrutinized.

While I do not dispute Drapeau’s assertion that the military should constantly be improving and updating its recruiting process, I am completely convinced that in Williams’s case, no amount of initial screening would have exposed his evil soul.

For the record, Williams joined the Canadian Air Force 23 years ago. During the course of his career, he would have been under virtually constant supervision and scrutiny. Through his basic officer training, flight school and all subsequent leadership development courses, Williams would have been put through extremely stressful challenges in a close-knit group environment.

Prior to each of his successive promotions, Williams would have been reviewed closely by his supervisors within the Air Force chain of command. As a pilot, Williams’ health—both physical and mental—would have been examined by qualified flight surgeons. For each incremental increase in his security clearance, Williams’s character would have been put through ever more stringent investigations.

Given that Williams had an operational command at Camp Mirage in Dubai, one would have to assume that he must have undergone one of the highest levels of topsecret clearance. As a transport pilot throughout his entire career, Williams would always have been deployed as part of a flight crew, meaning he wasn’t ever alone in his cockpit.

As the media photos constantly remind us, Williams’s flying experience brought him into personal contact with top military brass, senior politicians and even the Royal Family.

As the base commander at CFB Trenton, Williams would have been a VIP in his own right—at least to the 4,000 personnel he commanded. In between parades and ramp ceremonies where he was visible from the podium, Williams’s portrait would have adorned the walls in the lobby of the CFB Trenton headquarters.

In the fishbowl world that is the reality of military bases, even the slightest indiscretion on the part of the base commander would be instant fodder for the gossip and rumour mill.

Furthermore, as the commander, Williams had the responsibility of not only issuing personnel evaluation reports to his subordinates, he also had judicial authority to conduct summary trials for minor offences. As such, it was imperative that Williams maintain

a pristine facade of responsible behaviour in order to retain the moral authority necessary for him to effectively command.

One of the most disturbing aspects of the entire Williams case is the fact that he could commit a cold-blooded act of brutal murder and, just hours later, be photographed mugging playfully for the cameras at a United Way fundraiser at CFB Trenton.

More amazing still is the fact that Williams’s wife could not detect signs of the monster within the man who slept next to her all those years.

The Canadian Forces’ screening process didn’t fail in the case of Col. Williams because it would be impossible for any system to detect the unimaginable.

Had there been warning signs that were overlooked or had the military brass tried to cover up and protect Williams, then the Defence Department would be deserving of a black eye. And I would be the first to inflict it.

However, in this bizarre case, the system didn’t go off the rails—Russ Williams did.

Sorry Drapeau, but with all due respect, you goofed on this one.

ColonelRussWilliams Since I first met Colonel Michel Drapeau in the summer of 1994, I have had nothing but the utmost respect for this fine officer.

It was his insider knowledge of rampant corruption within the Department of National Defence in those days, and more importantly, his integrity in bringing those systemic shortfalls to the public’s attention, which resulted in many positive reforms for the Canadian Forces.

The media feeding frenzy during the Somalia Scandal in the mid-‘90s propelled Drapeau into an established position as a straight-shooting, independent military pundit.

To this day, Drapeau remains one of the most oft-quoted commentators on defence issues in the Canadian media and, I dare say, it is a rare occasion indeed that I disagree with his judgment.

However, I must admit that I found his commentary regarding Russell Williams and the military’s flawed screening process to be off the mark.

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MacKay a little too quick off the mark

For what it’s worth, my hat is off to Peter MacKay for his persistence in trying to sell the controversial F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to the Canadian public.

With an initial purchase price of approximately $9 billion for a fleet of just 65 of these next generation, multi-mission combat aircraft, the cost alone makes this project a tough sell. When one factors in the maintenance and spare parts expenses, the sum total balloons to about $16 billion, which makes the Joint Strike Fighter the most expensive military hardware procurement in Canada’s history.

That dollar figure is also guaranteed to whip up a political backlash and since the Conservative government announced their intention to proceed with this purchase in July, the hot air has been blowing heavy on Parliament Hill.

The Liberals have pledged that, should they form the next government, they will definitely review the decision to acquire the JSF, while the NDP are howling in protest that this was a sole-source rather than a competitive bidding process.

Always able to hold his own in a windstorm, MacKay has certainly done his level best to blow down the critics.

First it was the calculated release of information that, in the span of less than a month Russian aircraft had attempted to penetrate Canadian airspace twice. On both occasions it was claimed that Canadian CF-18 fighter jets had been scrambled to intercept the Russian TU-95 Bear bombers. While certain national tabloids ramped up the Cold War rhetoric to fever pitch, most media outlets easily saw through MacKay’s clumsy sales gimmick. Both NORAD and retired Canadian fighter pilots were quick to explain that at no time did the Russians penetrate our airspace and that such tests of response time are routinely conducted by both sides above the Arctic.

Further undermining MacKay’s credibility in this case was the illogical notion that this somehow proved the necessity to replace our CF-18s with more modern fighter aircraft to defend our territory. Anyone paying even scant attention to those stories would have noted that the Russian aircraft involved in these non-incidents are in fact 60-year-old propeller planes. The CF-18s which are currently in service may be 30 years old, but they were recently completely upgraded and rebuilt to give them an operational lifespan beyond 2020.

While one cannot argue the fact that Canada needs to be looking at a future replacement, the urgency which MacKay is attempting to generate simply doesn’t exist.

Last week MacKay altered his sales pitch a little to hype the fact that the Joint Strike Fighter purchase will be a potential windfall for Canadian aerospace companies. MacKay reiterated that point at a photo-op at CFB Bagotville by announcing that the future fleet of F-35s will be based there and at CFB Cold Lake. Given that these are the two bases from which our CF-18s currently operate, it hardly seemed newsworthy to make such a premature announcement.

Even if all goes according to plan and remains on schedule, the first of the JSFs would not be delivered until 2017; yet MacKay and the Conservative government are already cutting ribbons and expecting accolades for something they hope to acquire.

That said, MacKay is absolutely correct when he claims that the Canadian government put forward $150 million towards the JSF project to allow Canadian companies to compete for world-wide contracts. Where MacKay is a little light on the veritas is his suggestion that this investment money, first agreed to in 2005, somehow commits Canada to purchasing a fleet of theses aircraft.

Alan Williams was the Assistant Deputy Minister of Materiel at DND when that deal was struck. As the senior purchasing agent for DND, Williams was the individual who negotiated the terms of the agreement on behalf of the then Liberal government with Lockheed Martin. Unfortunately for MacKay and company, Williams remains both adamant and vocal that this in no way committed Canada to actually buying the JSF. In fact, Williams insists that a competitive bidding process should be held.

There are certainly other aircraft Canada could consider as replacements for the CF-18, such as Boeing’s new generation Super Hornet or the EADS Eurofighter. However, those in the Conservative camp who are determined to proceed with the JSF purchase point out the fact that the US chose the F-35 design because it contains stealth technology, which the Super Hornet does not.

That in itself raises the question as to how Canada intends to employ the next generation of fighter aircraft. If indeed we are only concerned with protecting our airspace, a non-stealth interceptor such as the Super Hornet will easily suffice. As the name implies, the Joint Strike Fighter’s primary role would be ground attack, with a secondary capability as an interceptor. Given that the US is hedging its bets and buying both JSF and Super Hornets, that line of reasoning is also null and void.

There may in fact be a very good reason for Canada to sole-source a $16 billion purchase of JSF aircraft, the only problem is MacKay has yet to find it in his bag of sales gimmick MacKayandF35

For what it’s worth, my hat is off to Peter MacKay for his persistence in trying to sell the controversial F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to the Canadian public.

Esprit de Corps