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Cannon off the mark PDF

CannonOne thing that never ceases to amaze me is the Canadian government’s relentless effort to spin the war in Afghanistan into a positive light. Equally gobsmacking is the number of media flunkies who all too eagerly give voice to this misleading nonsense.

Just last week, after a brief visit to Kabul, the foreign affairs minister garnered the headline “Cannon sees ‘strong signs’ of Afghan progress.”

Given that Lawrence Cannon attended a one-day international conference that was held under extremely tight security in the Afghan capital, one has to understand that he would have “seen” only the inside of armoured SUVs and fortified meeting facilities.

Had the reporter who wrote the story been travelling with Cannon at the time, that would have been evident. However the interview was conducted via telephone from Dubai, after Cannon had already finished his whirlwind visit. “We’re seeing progress in many fields and it’s going in the right direction,” claimed Cannon to the reporter.

 
Something doesn't sound right PDF
Last Wednesday Defence Minister Peter MacKay was in Halifax, along with Public Works and Government Services Minister Rona Ambrose, to trumpet a major shipbuilding contract. The price tag alone — approximately $2.6 billion for two new Joint Support Ships (JSS) — should have been cause for celebration among Canada’s long-suffering shipyards.
However, no matter how hard MacKay blew his well-worn vuvuzela, he failed to get a rise out of the deservedly cynical defence industry crowd. Perhaps, like the vuvuzela itself, one can only hear the same tuneless note so often before it goes from mildly amusing to unbearably irritating.
In order to get some perspective let’s rewind the clock to the early 1990s when this project first got underway.
At that juncture Canada’s navy maintained three auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessels — the HMC Ships Protecteur, Preserver and Provider. The role of the AORs was to enable small task forces of frigates and destroyers to remain at sea for longer durations. The rationale for having three of these in the fleet was to have at least one supply ship operating on each coast while the third rotated through routine refits in the dry dock. At that time, it was projected that HMCS Provider would be scrapped by 1998 due to her advanced age. And although they were five years younger, Protecteur and Preserver would also need replacing eventually.
Recognizing this necessity, in February 1993 MIL Systems submitted an unsolicited proposal to National Defence to build two of their independently designed strategic multi-role aid and replenishment transport (SMART) ships. These SMART vessels were to augment the AORs and, essentially, were also to provide the same types of support as the current JSS project. Their displacement was to be approximately 18,800 tons, they were to have a permanent crew of 81 sailors with the capacity to transport 600 troops with their vehicles, plus operate a large hospital ward and house a four-helicopter detachment.
One of the most forward-thinking design innovations of the SMART ship was its integral capability to contain and collect oil spills. Most importantly, the price tag per ship was only about $300 million and the two SMART ships would have been fully operational by 1996.
In rejecting the offer DND claimed that the SMART ships were “too big” for the navy’s need and, besides, they were not in the environmental protection business.
Fast-forward to April 2004, when Paul Martin’s Liberal government made the first announcement that the navy was to purchase a total of three JSS plus a large amphibious vessel to facilitate the landing and support of ground forces. Two years later, the newly elected Conservative government restated the intent to purchase three 28,000-ton JSS at a price of $700 million per ship and a further $800 million over 20 years of service life support.
Gone from the equation was any mention of the amphibious ship, but Canadians were told that this $2.9 billion investment was an “infusion of opportunity into Canada’s shipbuilding industry [which will mean] the creation of high-quality jobs and the fostering of industrial development which will, in turn, contribute to a stronger Canadian economy.”
Things initially moved fairly quickly as the original four consortiums opting to bid on this project were whittled down to just two by November 2006. Thyssen-Krupp Marine and SNC-Lavalin Profac were each paid $12.5 million to develop designs and submit bids by the summer of 2008.
That is when things went horribly wrong as one bidder offered to build just two JSS for the budgeted price, while the other offered to build all three but at a much higher price. Rather than make a decision, the Harper government instead decided not to decide, and aborted the procurement process.
With last week’s announcement about restarting the project, it is clear now that the navy will have to make do with just two JSS. While the overall price tag has dropped from $2.9 billion to $2.6 billion, one needs to factor in that with just two instead of three ships, a 20-year life service support would be reduced by one third, and the $300 million in “savings” comes from a reduction in support costs for fewer ships. In other words, we are now a further two years behind schedule and Canada will be buying just two ships for the original price of three.
The operational shortfall of having only two supply ships was clearly illustrated last February during the earthquake relief efforts to Haiti. With HMCS Protecteur in for a one-year refit, Canada had to send a frigate and a destroyer — along with a civilian chartered freighter — to perform tasks far better suited to a multipurpose supply ship.
So, to recap, the most recent JSS announcement is the third time the government has declared their intention to kick-start the shipbuilding industry. Since the first in 2004, the overall price tag has decreased by $300 million, the number of ships to be built has been reduced by one third, six years have lapsed, and not a job has been created.
Is it any wonder that Peter MacKay’s vuvuzela is hitting a sour note?
MacKayandShipLast Wednesday Defence Minister Peter MacKay was in Halifax, along with Public Works and Government Services Minister Rona Ambrose, to trumpet a major shipbuilding contract. The price tag alone — approximately $2.6 billion for two new Joint Support Ships (JSS) — should have been cause for celebration among Canada’s long-suffering shipyards.
However, no matter how hard MacKay blew his well-worn vuvuzela, he failed to get a rise out of the deservedly cynical defence industry crowd. Perhaps, like the vuvuzela itself, one can only hear the same tuneless note so often before it goes from mildly amusing to unbearably irritating.
In order to get some perspective let’s rewind the clock to the early 1990s when this project first got underway.
At that juncture Canada’s navy maintained three auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessels — the HMC Ships Protecteur, Preserver and Provider. The role of the AORs was to enable small task forces of frigates and destroyers to remain at sea for longer durations. The rationale for having three of these in the fleet was to have at least one supply ship operating on each coast while the third rotated through routine refits in the dry dock. At that time, it was projected that HMCS Provider would be scrapped by 1998 due to her advanced age. And although they were five years younger, Protecteur and Preserver would also need replacing eventually.
 
The messenger shoots back PDF

WallinOn June 23, the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence tabled an interim report on Canada’s present and future role in Afghanistan. Given that the witnesses interviewed by the committee were the usual war promoters, it was no surprise that their report recommended extending a military commitment beyond the current pullout date of July 2011.

In fact, the Senate committee was in lockstep agreement with the military’s new proposal to maintain approximately 700 troops in a non-combat training capacity for the Afghan National Army.

This policy was immediately applauded by the very same military pundits and cheerleaders who, only months earlier, had taken to the airwaves to try and convince Canadians that it was not possible to train Afghans without taking the trainees into actual combat. But I digress.

 
Amrullah Saleh: a Man with Answers PDF

SalehAlmost lost in the barrage of tragic news from Afghanistan last week – NATO convoy destroyed, US helicopter downed, coalition casualties mounted and a massive suicide bombing in Kandahar – was a small snippet that two Afghan leaders had resigned from their posts.  Hanif Atmar, the Minister of the Interior and Amrullah Saleh, the head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), both cited their own failure to prevent Taliban attacks against the recently held peace assembly and reconciliation talks in Kabul as the reason for their resignation.

While it is true that three suicide bombers did penetrate the city and attempted to disrupt the gathering of Afghan tribal leaders, the fact is these assaults were unsuccessful.  There were no victims, two attackers were killed and the third was captured.  In fact, most western observers praised the prompt and restrained response displayed by the Afghan security forces.

 
Further Cuts to Operational Readiness PDF
It is truly a strange time in the wacky
world of Canadian politics when our
cash-strapped navy finds a champion
in the New Democratic Party. Yet that is
exactly what happened when word leaked
out last week that budget constraints were
forcing the navy brass to cut operational
readiness to the bone.
On the eve of the May 4 celebration to
mark the Canadian Navy’s proud 100-year
history, Chief of Maritime Staff Vice-Admiral
Dean McFadden issued an internal letter
informing naval formations of a tremendous
reduction in the service’s capability.
According to the directive, six of 12 maritime
coastal defence vessels were to be removed
from operational duty, and an additional three
frigates and one destroyer would be conducting
domestic operations to a “limited degree.”
In order to sustain the funding for longterm
modernization programs for the navy,
McFadden said a number of other planned
projects could no longer be supported. Those
on the chopping block included a key weapon
system proposed for the Protecteur-class auxiliary
vessels, and some anti-submarine measures
earmarked for the City-class frigates.
In defence of his decisions, McFadden wrote:
“I have had to make difficult choices that will
directly impact fleet capability and availability
this year, and possibly for the medium term.”
Navy analysts were quick to point the
finger of blame at the massive funding
required to sustain the army’s operations in
Afghanistan. The higher profile of the battle
group in Kandahar and the higher threat
level to the troops deployed there have
certainly ensured that the army receives the
lion’s share of the operational budget.
However, the navy has certainly performed
a stellar role in post-9/11 security operations—
most notably the recent anti-piracy
patrols off the Horn of Africa. Add to that the
Conservative government’s repeated promise
to fulfil their Canada First Defence Strategy,
within which the navy figures (not to mention
the century of service celebrations), and it’s
easy to see why the navy brass would feel
slighted by the current shortage of funding.
Under the terms of the new operational
reductions Canada would maintain just four
frigates (HMCS Winnipeg, Fredericton, Calgary
and Charlottetown) at a state of high readiness,
with one destroyer (HMCS Algonquin)
being capable of a reduced state of readiness.
With the remainder being six tiny Kingstonclass
coastal patrol vessels and two supply
ships long overdue for retirement, it was apparent
that the Canadian Navy would be but a
fragment of its current self after the cuts.
What many forget is that the original plan
for Canada’s post-Cold War navy was based
on a fleet consisting of four modernized
destroyers, 18 frigates, three supply ships, 12
maritime coastal defence vessels and up to
six new diesel electric submarines.
For those keeping track of the ongoing
saga of the four used British submarines
that Canada acquired in 1998, only one—
HMCS Cornerbrook—is actually in operational
service. Two others (HMCS Windsor
and Victoria) are still in refit, and HMCS
Chicoutimi remains a burnt-out hulk since
its Atlantic crossing tragedy in 2004.
Of course, those navy buffs who are busy
celebrating the centennial will proudly reflect
upon the Second World War glory days when
the RCN boasted no fewer than 400 ships
afloat, and ranked as the third largest navy in
the world. While even the most ardent navy
boosters would not advocate a modern-day
armada on that scale, the nostalgic among
them have started a campaign to reinstate
the title of Royal to the Canadian Navy.
On the political battlefield, NDP MP Peter
Stoffer has declared himself the defender
of the cash-strapped fleet, calling upon the
Conservative government to reverse the
announced operational cuts.
“What a slap in the face to the men and
women of the Canadian Navy,” said Stoffer
in a press release. “How bittersweet that we
just celebrated the navy’s centennial, meanwhile
the navy is struggling with a budgetary
shortfall.” Stoffer concluded his statement by
calling upon Defence Minister Peter MacKay
to “immediately address this issue.”
The NDP demanding that the Conservatives
spend more on defence? Quick, somebody go
check the temperature in hell.
(For the record, at the end of the working
day on Friday, May 14, Chief of Defence Staff
Gen. Walter Natynczyk announced that the Navy
reduction order was to be rescinded on the
instruction of Defence Minister Peter MacKay.)

ChicoutimiIt is truly a strange circumstance in the whacky world of Canadian politics that our cash-strapped navy would find a champion in the New Democratic Party. Yet that is exactly what happened when word leaked out that budget constraints were forcing the navy brass to cut operational readiness to the bone.

On the eve of the May 4 celebration of the Canadian Navy’s proud history, Chief of Maritime Staff Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden issued an internal letter informing naval formations of a tremendous reduction in the senior service’s capability. According to the directive, six of twelve maritime coastal defence vessels will be removed from operational duty, and an additional three frigates and one destroyer will be conducting domestic operations to a “limited degree.”

 
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