The Case For Defending The Baltics

“Why defend the Baltics and not Ukraine?”

(Volume 25-02)

By Joe Fernandez

Although I support a foreign policy that generally follows George Washington’s Farewell Address, which is to say avoiding foreign wars altogether, I argue that a case can be made for defending the Baltics.

In Between The Giants: The Battle For the Baltics In World War II, Dr. Prit Buttar details how the Germans in the Baltics, with only 146 tanks and 150 planes, and with “infantry divisions weak in terms of mobility and anti-tank firepower” fought against 650 Soviet tanks and 1,250 Soviet planes. The Germans not only managed to fight the Red Army in the region from January 1944 to May 1945, but to also attrite the Red Army so that, by September 1944, the Soviet divisions in the area only had 3,000 to 7,000 troops apiece instead of their nominal strengths of 12,000. This was at a time when the Red Army was 2 million strong.

In contrast, according to renowned Russia expert Dr. Mark Galeotti’s The Modern Russian Army 1992-2016, the Russian military in 2016 had only 766,000 troops, with the elite 4th Guards Kantemirovsk Tank Division and 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division of the First Tank Army of the Western Military District (which borders the Baltics) each only having 6,000–7,000 troops.

Galeotti’s report of his conversations with Russian flag rank officers in the January 19, 2018 Guardian article “Forget Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent: Here Is What Russia Is Really Afraid Of” is as important. One Russian officer told Galeotti, “Britain has always had the best light infantry in the world and the bastards get places faster than we would like.” A Russian naval officer told him that Britain’s new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, “would make a great missile target,” which can be interpreted as a nuanced allusion to Russia’s access to China’s carrier-killing DF-21D missiles. Russian naval officers also told Galeotti that they were more concerned with the Royal Navy’s submarines and frigates and Britain’s ability to keep enough ships deployed at any one time. Lastly, another soldier told Galeotti, “these days, the Europeans have armies but no soldiers, while the British have always had warriors (‘boets’).”

The sum of the previous two paragraphs is that British and Canadian troops and ships in the Baltics could plausibly deter a Russia of only 144 million people (in contrast to America’s over 300 million) from getting bogged down in a drawn-out war for the region. The question then becomes, “Why defend the Baltics and not Ukraine?” My answer is that there are material Canadian interests in the Baltics and only a free trade treaty with Ukraine.

That specific material Canadian interest in the Baltics is Alimentation Couche-Tard, which operates 2,225 stores in Canada (each store employing multiple Canadian taxpayers), and which is also a leader in convenience store and road transportation fuel retail in the Baltics. Couche-Tard also has operations in Russia, which constitute another argument against the anti-Russian jingoism of habitual letter-writers. However, given Russia’s treatment of Anglo-American investor Bill Browder, it is in Canada’s interest that Alimentation Couche-Tard’s Baltic operations do not fall under Russian control as well.

Some would say that I am arguing for the exploitation of the Canadian Armed Forces as taxpayer-subsidised guarantors of a private multinational. This is based on the popular, and false, dichotomy of interests between “the rich” and the working class/“the poor.” If one looks at the holdings of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and of the Canada Pension Plan, one readily sees that union members and ordinary pensioners also benefit when corporations do well. The CPP also holds equity in Alimentation Couche-Tard, whose other shareholders include the Jarislowsky Fraser Canadian Equity Fund, Scotia Bank, TD Bank and the Bank of Montreal (BMO). In turn, Québec’s Desjardins Insurance is an investor in Jarislowsky Fraser, while Scotia Bank runs several funds, which can be used as retirement funds. BMO runs a Group Retirement Savings Plan and TD works with the Canada Pension Plan.

Furthermore, Alimentation Couche-Tard paid taxes in the amounts of $383 million in 2017, $398 million in 2016, and $306 million in 2015. Taxes pay for things like military salaries and veterans’ benefits.

I still personally oppose CAF deployment to the Baltics or anywhere else that would push Russia further into what Douglas Schoen and Melik Kaylan call The Russia-China Axis. That being said, I must acknowledge that there are tangible Canadian interests in the Baltics where there are none in Ukraine.

Kosovo Independence: Celebration Or Disaster

“[Kosovo is] by any standard a failed state”

(Volume 25-02)

By James Bissett

On February 17 Kosovo celebrated the tenth anniversary of its unilateral declaration of independence. The United States-led NATO countries may want to join in the celebrations since it was NATO’s 78-day illegal bombing campaign of Serbia that forcibly separated Kosovo from Serbia and lead to the state’s independence.

Despite the refusal of some of its members — Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Slovakia — the remaining members of the alliance, including Canada, followed the lead of the United States and recognized Kosovo as an independent state. By doing so they were in direct violation of UN Resolution 1244, which had reaffirmed Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo.

After ten years and under heavy pressure from the United States, out of the 193 total membership of the United Nations, 111 members have recognized Kosovo independence. Those that have not done so have refused on the grounds that a simple declaration itself is not sufficient grounds for independence.

There must be evidence of long-term mistreatment and lack of representation in the government, as well as a referendum by the citizens of the country concerned. None of these conditions existed in Kosovo; in fact, the Albanians there enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within the Yugoslav federation.

A further consideration was the fear that recognition would set a dangerous precedent for all those minorities who might follow the example of the Albanians in Kosovo. The thought of several or more of these unilaterally declaring independence is seen to be a serious threat to global security.

The most vocal objection to the recognition of Kosovo independence came, naturally enough, from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who warned that recognition would open a Pandora’s Box and was a violation of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Accords relating to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Russia, a traditional friend of Serbia, suspected there was more in the United States’ insistence of independence for Kosovo than humanitarian concerns.

After the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was no longer seen as a useful buffer between the West and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Berlin, and later Washington, saw geopolitical advantages in carving the country up into small independent states that would be dependent on their benefactors and easily managed.

The first to be granted independence was Croatia and Slovenia, to be followed by Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro and then Kosovo. Serbia, the largest of the Yugoslav republics, was made into a villain and accused of mistreating the large Albanian population in Kosovo. An armed uprising by the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and subsequent clashes with Serbian security forces, which were accused of committing atrocities, resulted in NATO’s March 1999 military intervention and the bombing of Serbia.

Leading up to and during the bombing, the U.S.-led NATO forces waged a powerful media campaign designed to demonize the Serbian people and their controversial leader Slobodan Milosevic (the “Butcher of the Balkans”). It was falsely claimed that genocide and ruthless ethnic cleansing was taking place in Kosovo. In fact, the number of deaths in the conflict has now been estimated to be approximately 2,000 and the United Nations has agreed that the mass exodus from Kosovo of both Albanians and Serbs began after the bombing started.

The conflict ended and the bombing of Serbia stopped when a United Nations peace settlement was arranged with Milosevic. United Nations Resolution 1244 laid out the terms of the agreement, which among other things, reaffirmed Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo, called for the return of all those displaced by the conflict, the withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, and for the territory to be placed under the control of a NATO-led protection force (KFOR).

Immediately after the withdrawal of Serbian forces began the pillaging and murder of the non-Albanians who had not already fled. Serbian and Roma houses and apartments were broken into and the inhabitants either killed or forced to flee. The rampage of killing and lawlessness continued and as late as 2004, when mobs of Albanians destroyed or damaged a further 200 Christian churches and monasteries, some of them heritage structures dating back to the 14th century. All of this horror took place under the watchful eyes of the NATO-led protection force.

Kosovo is a failed state with massive unemployment and crime; corruption is prevalent, with a leadership deeply involved in the drug trade, arms and human smuggling, not to mention allegations about the trafficking of human body parts. By any standard, this is a failed state. Its independence has been a disaster.

Kosovo has been the stepchild of the United States and has been used by NATO to advance the geopolitical aims of the U.S. It was not by accident that one of the first acts of the United States in Kosovo was to build the largest military base there since Vietnam. Furthermore, Kosovo was but one of the first steps to expand NATO eastward. It was during the bombing of Serbia that then U.S. President Bill Clinton announced the addition to NATO of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Since then, NATO has encircled Russia with NATO member states. As a member of the German Bundestag cynically observed, German Panzers are once again within reach of Leningrad.

U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans and Eastern Europe is driven by the strategic aim of controlling the oil, gas and uranium land routes from resource-rich Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries at the expense of Russia. In doing so it is playing the game of realpolitik and has forsaken the basic principles of the founding fathers, as well as turning NATO into an aggressive military machine directed against Russia.

Like the disaster of Kosovo, this is a policy that can only end in catastrophe.

Going To Pot

“... Lamarre has the recruits and youth of Canada’s military at the forefront of his mind”

(Volume 25-01)

By Michael Nickerson

Hang on to your hats and pass the Doritos. There’s a new threat on the horizon; a menace to morale, a danger to discipline, putting the military’s supply of Pringles in peril. This threat has been under intensive study by military planners and experts alike for almost a year now. If you haven’t guessed what I’m talking about, then you’ve had too many special brownies. I’m referring to the demon weed, the wacky tabacky, the reefer madness. Yes, marijuana is soon to be legal in Canada, and even the military isn’t safe.

Now before you spit that mouthful of Twinkies out of your mouth in a fit of giggles and laughter, let me remind you this is serious stuff we’re discussing. You won’t be laughing so hard when a soldier high on hashish and crazed with a case of severe munchies parks a Leopard 2A4 tank in the middle of your local Mini-Mart I can assure you, so pay attention.

Right, so thanks to our pot-puffing prime minister and his cadre of cannabis-addled ministers, Canadians will legally (I say legally!) be able to smoke whatever strain of sensimilla they might fancy come Canada Day. No end of insanity will most assuredly ensue, and the impact on the Canadian Armed Forces may be incalculable.

Thanks to the investigative reporting of CBC News, we now know senior officials are actively investigating this potent peril. As Commander, Military Personnel Command LGen Chuck Lamarre says, “We have to be able to protect the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to be able to send men and women — at a moment’s notice — to operate in some very, very dangerous and demanding environments.” Being seriously stoned just won’t cut it people.

Lamarre’s worries don’t stop there. “We are concerned about folks who have the challenges of operating heavy equipment, weaponry, who are on call on a regular basis to go and do things, like our [search and rescue] technicians.” Indeed! And before all you acid-smoking hippy freaks start pointing out there isn’t a whole lot of functional equipment for people to be flying, driving, or sailing at the moment, never you mind. It’s coming after the next election, and our military needs to be THC-free before it happens!

But more to the point, there is a serious workplace safety issue to consider here, as many private companies and their senior management are also not just contemplating, but spending sleepless nights hiding under their beds with trepidation. Legions of the stoned arriving at work, getting themselves sucked into conveyor belts, sticking their heads in presses, or raiding the executive snack bar. Horrific when you think about it, but just picture a rifle in their hands and you’ll never sleep again.

Thankfully for current and future members of Canada’s military, workplace safety, physical and/or mental health has always been of primary consideration for the top brass. Be it exposure to toxic chemicals or depleted uranium, sleep deprivation, sexual assault or mental illness, the men and women in uniform have always known someone has had their back.

And make no mistake, Lamarre has the recruits and youth of Canada’s military at the forefront of his mind. He’s concerned “what the impact of marijuana can be on the developing brain.” As he pointed out, “we hire the 18-to-25 age group. We want to be aware of what the impact might be on the well-being of those folks who might be consuming this product.” Now, our military has always been concerned over the developing brain, particularly with its young recruits. To say those young brains have been nothing but precious goes without saying. But gosh, Lamarre is really going above and beyond the call. It warms the heart.

So perhaps this is a bit of hysteria on my part. It’s not all going to pot. The troops are well looked after, equipped, and ready. And we should all rest easy that LGen Lamarre and his team are on top of the important things, looking to keep those crazy changes going on in Canadian society separate from its military. Because there is one thing you never want to happen, and that’s to have the armed forces reflect the society it protects. Crazy talk that is; stoner talk.

This deserves a toast. Unfortunately, all I have is Doritos.

Crown Assets Disposal - Australian Division

“... LGen Michael John Hood was nowhere in sight. ADM (Mat) Patrick Finn was nowhere in sight”

(Volume 25-01)

By Vincent J. Curtis

Canada’s choice for interim fighter aircraft to replace our aging CF-188 Hornets has been announced: Australia’s aging F-18 Hornets. That’s right, the aircraft our pilots are going fly — perhaps into 2035 — are coming from Crown Assets Disposal, Australia Division.

The reason why Australia is surplussing its early 1980s vintage F-18s is that they are replacing them right now with brand new F-35s from Lockheed Martin. You know, the aircraft the Trudeau team won’t touch because it got the cooties from Team Harper? The Australians, apparently, weren’t bothered by that.

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) aren’t getting Super Hornets as interim replacements because Boeing had the temerity to take on domestic favourite, Bombardier.

Conspicuous by its absence has been noise favourable to the decision from the RCAF. The photo taken of the decision’s announcement team doesn’t have a single member of the RCAF at the table. Let’s apply a little Kremlinology to the photo and see what we can tease out of it.

The position of right marker is taken by Chief of Defence Staff General Jonathan Vance, and he is the one doing the talking. Next to him is Minister of National Defence (MND), Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Harjit Sajjan, Vance’s nominal boss, with hands folded. Sajjan isn’t making the announcement perhaps because the government doesn’t want it to look like they are outright shafting the RCAF with the decision. With Vance ramrodding what the decision will be, it doesn’t look so bad.

Next to Sajjan is Carla Qualtrough, Minister of Public Services and Procurement Canada. She being where she is is the only logical component of the photograph. Next to Qualtrough sits Navdeep Bains, Minister of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development. What is he doing there? He is just filling space, because buying used has nothing to do with innovation, science, or economic development.

Finally, at the end of the table, is Minister of Transport Marc Garneau. Again, what is he doing there other than filling space?

Chief of the Air Staff and Commander of the RCAF, Lieutenant-General Michael John Hood was nowhere in sight. Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) Patrick Finn was nowhere in sight. Neither gentleman was quoted saying something favourable in any of the stories I’ve read commenting on the decision at all. Not a peep from anyone having to fly in these aging Australian crates, the service history of which RCAF maintenance has only second-hand information.

The political dodging started immediately. When challenged on the decision, MND Sajjan always turned to saying that the government was actually announcing that the replacement competition would start … in another three years, 2020! That a replacement competition was to be held to avoid taking the F-35 was an announcement made during the 2015 election, and repeated immediately after the election of the Trudeau government. The competition to start in 2020 is to reach a decision in 2023 with first acquisition starting in 2025, according to MND Sajjan.

What is significant about those dates is that no one in the photograph is going to be around then. The next federal election is in 2019, which means the Trudeau government is making pledges potentially on behalf of its successor, and the next election after 2019 would conceivably be 2023 — the year of the announcement of the winner of the competition.

Vance will be retired. Sajjan, if he is around in 2023, won’t be Minister of National Defence; Garneau will likely have retired. Young Navdeep Bains and Carla Qualtrough might still be in cabinet — assuming the Trudeau government itself survives into 2023, by no means a given.

Given the state of play in the fighter market, in 2023 the Super Hornet will be off the market. Other than the F-16, which will still be around, and the F-35, the only other source of Gen 4.5 or greater aircraft will be the Saab Gripen from Sweden, the Dassault Rafale from France, or the Eurofighter Typhoon from a European consortium. I can’t imagine that either Russia or China would sell us aircraft that would be any good. Not much else to choose from, off the shelf.

These Australian jets don’t come for free. The estimate being kicked around is $500 million to get them air-worthy again. When challenged on that point, MND Sajjan would dodge, meaning that the amount is at least that much, and probably more. Note that the fly-away cost for 18 newly built F-16s from Lockheed Martin is in the neighbourhood of $750 million. For a few dollars more, the RCAF could have had absolutely new and certifiably air-worthy aircraft capable of carrying the load for 20 years, and the F-16 is famously low maintenance. Forty-year-old F-18s, not so much. You have to wonder if the lower initial investment won’t be offset by higher routine maintenance within five years.

The RCAF got shafted with the decision to take old Australian F-18s. They’re going to get shafted again in 2023 if the Trudeau government is still around. The silence from the RCAF brass is deafening. Can we expect a resignation or an early retirement from that quarter soon?

Unique Opportunity At A Fraction Of The Cost

“If Embraer can develop a CAS plane from a crop duster, why can’t Bombardier do the same?”

(Volume 25-01)

By Joe Fernandez

Much has been said about Boeing pressuring the U.S. Commerce Department to slam extraordinary tariffs on Bombardier’s C-Series aircraft and the Canadian government’s subsequent decision to purchase used Royal Australian Air Force F-18 Hornets instead of paying Boeing for new Super Hornets. None of this legion of jeremiads has noticed the unique opportunity this crisis affords the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada as a whole.

The January 2017 Smithsonian Air & Space Magazine article “Return of the Light Brigade: To meet the demands of 21st century warfare, militaries are reaching for a Vietnam-era weapon” by Tim Wright reports how the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy are looking at crop dusters converted into Combat Air Support (CAS) planes. The rationale behind these tests is that crop dusters converted to CAS are less expensive to build and maintain than are A-10 Warthogs or F/A-18 Hornets. The programme is called OA-X (Observation, Attack-Experimental).

There have been several entrants to the OA-X programme, including the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine and the Textron Scorpion. The progress of the OA-X programme has been reported on by The National Interest in a number of articles. As well, the October-November edition of the French journal RAIDS Aviation has an article on the OA-X programme, “Antiguérilla : Programme OA-X Quel futur avion d’attaque léger pour l’USAF?” (“Anti-guerilla: The OA-X Programme Which future light attack plane for the USAF?”) by Jean-Pascal Héraut, who notes that several companies had entrants that did not make the cut of the OA-X programme. One of the failed entrants was none other than Boeing’s OV-10X Super Bronco.

One successful entrant whose name comes up in Wright’s and Héraut’s respective articles, as well as in the National Interest articles, is the A-29 Super Tucano. This entrant is of interest because it is manufactured by Bombardier’s most direct weight class rival, Embraer of Brazil. The A-29 Super Tucano is already in use by the Royal Air Force and the USAF, and Wright’s article indicates that Lebanon, Nigeria and Mali are also purchasing the Super Tucano.

If Embraer can develop a CAS plane from a crop duster, why can’t Bombardier do the same? It is too late for Bombardier to develop its equivalent of the Super Tucano as an entrant for the US OA-X programme. Nevertheless, a Bombardier Super Tucano equivalent still offers an opportunity for the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada as a whole.

Were Bombardier to develop and produce its own Super Tucano equivalent, each Canadian Army infantry-armour mechanized brigade group could have its own integral RCAF CAS squadron composed of Bombardier-manufactured Super Tucano equivalents, under the control of CFB Gagetown-trained Royal Canadian Artillery Joint Terminal Attack Controllers. This would increase the independence of Canada’s mechanized brigades, in contrast to the situation described in U.S. Special Forces Major Rusty Bradley’s book Lions of Kandahar, wherein Canadian troops in Afghanistan had to rely on the Royal Netherlands Air Force for air support. Institutionally, this would strengthen the bonds between the Canadian Army and the RCAF to the extent that each service would be more inclined to regard the other service as an ally rather than a rival. For instance, the Rhodesian Air Force worked hand in hand with the Rhodesian Light Infantry and SAS to successfully pull off 1977’s Operation DINGO, which destroyed a ZANLA base in Mozambique, as described in Ian Pringle’s Dingo Firestorm.

A Bombardier-manufactured Super Tucano equivalent would also allow Canada to help its allies at a minimal human cost. Third World countries allied to the West, such as the constituent nations of the African Union Mission fighting Al-Shabab in Somalia (AMISOM), cannot afford A-10 Warthogs. A Super Tucano is less expensive to purchase and to maintain than is a Warthog. A Bombardier-manufactured Super Tucano equivalent could allow Canada to create a 21st century version of one of its most successful contributions to the Allied cause in the Second World War, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, with the RCAF training allied Third World pilots in Canadian-manufactured planes purchased by the pilots’ home nations. This would simultaneously free the F-18s for NORAD use.

Bombardier’s Class A shareholders render the board immune to common stockholder pressure. Bombardier has also received $372 million from Canadian taxpayers who can encourage the board in ways its common stockholders cannot.

The Final Hundred Days

“... the artillery fire of a thousand guns became a science ...”

(Volume 24-12)

By Vincent J. Curtis

Thoughts of winter puts one in mind of cold, dark, and wet. You know, World War I kind of miserable. In respect of misery, the recollection of others is better than personal experience. With Remembrance Day and the centenary of the Great War in mind, I got hold of a newly released history of a battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) of World War I. It Can’t Last Forever is a history of the 19th Battalion, written by David Campbell, a professor of history who received his doctorate for his history of the 2nd Division of the Canadian Corps, of which the 19th was a part.

We remember the Canadian Corps of World War I for the mud of Passchendaele and for the brilliant victory at Vimy Ridge. Perhaps we dimly recall the Hundred Days campaign at the end; but when we think of World War I, we think of the mud of Flanders.

This is unfortunate. In doing so, we miss what the Canadian Corps developed into by the end, in virtue of Canadian talent and innovation. When we think of the Somme, we think of tens of thousands dying for hundreds of yards, while Vimy saw a dramatic gain of 4,500 yards in a morning.

What we might want to reflect upon is that relentless Canadian machine of the Hundred Days campaign — that drove the enemy before it at rates of 6,000 and 7,000 yards a day — using techniques that foreshadowed World War II.

Military theorists date the beginning of manoeuvre warfare with the German infiltration (or “Hutier”) tactics used in the Operation MICHAEL offensives that began on March 21, 1918. But the technique thought of today as manoeuvre warfare — blitzkrieg — with its coordinated application of ground strafing aircraft, tanks, advancing infantry, and supporting artillery, was first used against the Germans in the Hundred Day campaign. By the Canadians.

Yes, the aircraft of WWI were more of a nuisance than a force multiplier, and the tanks never could be relied upon. But they were there, and impressed the Germans.

By 1918, a platoon in a Canadian Corps battalion was organized into two sections of riflemen, one section of Lewis gunners, and one section of “bombers.” The bombers were those expert in throwing Mills bombs (which later became the 36 grenade) and in firing rifle grenades (predecessor of the 60-mm mortar). This latter section, supported or augmented by the Lewis gunners, took out the machine-gun nests that formed one of the principle features of the German defence. They coordinated fire and movement with the infantry sections to overcome pockets of resistance. By the end of the Hundred Days, tanks had become mechanically reliable enough to provide, at times, armoured cover for advancing infantry, and to destroy wire and some of those nasty machine-gun nests.

With its creeping and standing barrages, the artillery fire of a thousand guns became a science. Lacking wireless radios, detailed control was exerted by field telephone, whose wires were easily broken, and with signal rockets that called for protective fire. Artillery fire was supplemented by the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, equipped with armoured cars and Vickers heavy machine guns for neutralizing an area with indirect fire plunging vertically into trenches.

Trenches during this time were still dug; but with movement as large and as fast as occurred during the Hundred Days, field defences were quick and expedient and lacked the sophisticated depth of the Somme or the Hindenburg Line. By keeping up the pressure, the break in was not the bloodbath it was at the Somme.

During a forward thrust, Allied forces pushed as far as their artillery support could reach, and then tended to stall as German artillery began to dominate the field. Once the Allied guns were moved up, increasingly by mechanical transport, forward movement by the infantry would resume.

A striking feature of the Canadian Corps was as a learning institution. Starting with Arthur Currie, commander of 1st Division, and later Corps Commander, and British General Julien Byng, the Canadian leadership strove to learn, disseminate, and apply the lessons of war being fought around them. When not in immediate reserve, Canadian troops practiced their individual and collective skills. Every infanteer practiced his marksmanship, his use of the bayonet, throwing Mills bombs and shooting rifle grenades. He practiced with the Lewis gun, even if that wasn’t his formal job.

After polishing individual skills, section, platoon, and company tactics were practiced. The men were kept physically fit by long marches and sporting events. By the Hundred Days, it was understood that each man had to be able to fill in for someone else. The losses among platoon commanders was the highest proportionately of any rank, and so being able to take command of the platoon in battle was a secondary skill developed in the subordinate leaders.

The Canadian emphasis on patrolling emerged in the Canadian Corps early in the war. “No man’s land belongs to us” was one resolution of the Corps, and trench raids were a common feature of the war years, both as a means of protection and as a means of gathering intelligence. Sniping was another skill applied with vigour in the Corps. The procedure of “relief in place” was perfected in World War I. By the Hundred Days, the Canadian Corps were past masters of phase lines, passing through, and vertical and horizontal coordination.

Much bad has been written about the leadership of Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia. He had little use for British generals and for the alleged expertise of the regulars. He relied upon the genius of Canada’s civilian professionals to mobilize and to mould the CEF. He ensured that Canadians fought together in one recognized unit with an eye towards the recognition of Canada after the war as a power independent of Britain. The brilliant performance of the Canadian Corps at Vimy and the power the Corps demonstrated during the Hundred Days fulfilled that vision.

We're Looking Into It!

“But looking is so much easier than doing ...”

(Volume 24-11)

By Michael Nickerson

Bureaucracies everywhere have a favourite expression: We’re looking into it. Never has a better phrase been created. It buys time, saves face, makes one sound thoughtful if perhaps not quite intellectual, but more to the point, it conveys to one and all that the people involved are busy; doing things.

So let’s parse that. There’s the “we” aspect of the phrase, which can refer to any group or organization from your local cable provider to the Department of National Defence (as an example). There’s the “into it” which could involve diving and swimming pools, or possibly horse jumping and doing a face plant into manure. But it’s the “looking” that should get everyone’s spidey senses tingling. As verbs go, it’s one of the most useless.

Yet it should come as no surprise that it’s the verb of choice for Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan. In an interview on Remembrance Day with Omar Sachedina of CTV News, the well-spoken-if-somewhat-ineffectual minister responded to the thorny public relations problem concerning special duty allowance cuts and clawbacks for Canadian Armed Forces members injured for more than 180 days with that time-honoured “looking into it” response.

Just in case you missed it, the good folks at National Defence decided in September to change the rules concerning the special monthly allowance paid to those involved in high-risk operations, including special forces, submariners, search-and-rescue, and the like. In short, if you’re injured for more than 180 days, you lose your allowance. That you were injured doing your high-risk duty is neither here nor there. Thanks for your dedication, and for extra giggles, let’s make it retroactive!

Now, as reported by Mercedes Stephenson of CTV News (busy folks over there, round of applause) not only can this lead to a sudden decrease during recuperation of anywhere between $3,700 to $23,000 in a six-month period (depending on level of risk assessment), but personnel will understandably be compelled and expected to hide injuries, or return to service not fully ready. To add insult to injury (pun sadly intended), elite special forces are under a security gag order to prevent them from discussing this or any other issue.

This comes on the heels of another report concerning homeless veterans (never thought those last two words would sit together like that, but there you are). Specifically, some 770 veterans are homeless in this country (at least that’s the number who self-identify). And the current government’s response to the problem is to allocate $4-million over four years, starting in April 2018 after a good cold Canadian winter, assuming they don’t take another look at it first.

But looking is so much easier than doing, don’t cha think? Just ask the many First Nations in Canada who are waiting for the basic right to clean water. It was a cornerstone of the Team Justin™ election platform of 2015, yet today there are still over 100 boil-water advisories amongst First Nation communities after two years in government (down from 139). How much does it take to produce clean water? They’re looking into it, more to follow; keep that water boiling.

And keep those offshore bank accounts pouring in (or rather, out). That’s something else Team Justin™ has promised to look into: tax evasion. Yet when it comes to offshore tax havens, since 2009 $55-billion has been shipped off shore in legal tax avoidance measures that the Trudeau government has done nothing remotely substantial to deal with, Paradise Papers be damned.

Of course, they’re looking into it. So rest assured. It’s just that doing bit that’s a little shaky. Too many First Nations still do not have clean drinking water as one example. More close to the military home, too many veterans have been let down and looked over, and too many active members forced to face the fiscal constraints not of their own making. There have been promises made but not kept, while too many people seem to escape through loopholes and leave it to the rest to pay the price.

I dare say it’s time to start looking into that. I dare say it’s time to do more than just look.

Running Out Of Time

“the F-16 remains a front-line aircraft today in either role”

(Volume 24-10)

By Vincent J. Curtis

If there are common elements in the government’s acquisition of new equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces, they are tardiness, indecision, and a lack of imagination. All three elements are at play in the selection of interim replacements for the CF-18 fleet or, more precisely, a lack of replacements.

The Liberal government boxed itself into a mess. To spite the legacy of the Harper government, the Trudeau Liberals announced that the F-35 would be the last aircraft on Earth that the government would buy to replace the CF-18. Instead, a prolonged and detailed examination of potential replacements was ordered, postponing a final decision.

The time would be filled by requiring world-renowned aircraft manufacturers to prove to the satisfaction of the Canadian government their capabilities to produce a world-renowned fighter aircraft, and then to have them teach our experts in the RCAF the art of sucking eggs in precise and excruciating detail.

Trouble in paradise arose when it became clear that the existing fleet of CF-18s on NORAD deployment would not last long enough for the Trudeau temporizing to play itself out. An “interim replacement” needed to be found.

The obvious choice was to acquire more F/A-18s. However, Boeing had moved on and the closest new thing to the old aircraft was the F/A-18 E/F Super-Hornet, built on an airframe some 25 per cent larger than the original Hornet model.

No problem. The Super Hornet was being sold by Boeing as completely interoperable with the older Hornet, and training and transition disruption to the new model would be minimal. Then, the Trudeau government made very public its displeasure with Boeing’s demand that the U.S. government impose import duties against a Canadian government favourite, Bombardier. In October, trade sanctions were imposed, import duties being a crippling 220 per cent.

There is lots of hypocrisy to go around. Boeing is the largest client of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and Boeing doesn’t make an aircraft that competes in the same marketplace as the Bombardier one. Boeing argues that it saw Airbus, its largest competitor worldwide, start in the same way Bombardier did: as a small, regional manufacturer supported by government subsidies. And Boeing is doing extremely well, so well in fact that it will still do well without an order for Super Hornets from Canada.

The Trudeau government would be eating a good deal of crow to have to purchase Super Hornets from Boeing, and has started to look around for something else. There is talk of buying used Hornets from Australia, and Lockheed Martin is devilishly offering F-35s as “interim replacements.”

The obvious solution that is being missed requires an entrepreneurial mind to see. This solution is to truly embrace the interim notion, and to buy new F-16s to replace the old CF-18s, committing to employing them in the NORAD role for the next 10 to 20 years, postponing a decision on fifth-generation fighter jets for, well, the next generation.

The F-16 is still being produced by Lockheed Martin, and is presently in its V for Viper model. Because the Fighting Falcon is made by Lockheed Martin, we are keeping alive the company that may yet deliver us the F-35 — in 20 years’ time. The F-16V is configurable as an air-superiority dogfighter, or as a ground-attack aircraft; and the F-16 remains a front-line aircraft today in either role. It will remain a first-line fighter aircraft for the next decade or two. As a fighter platform, it outclasses the Super Hornet and the F-35; neither aircraft would want to engage an F-16 in a dogfight. The F-35 would need to rely on its stealthiness and long-range missiles to defeat an F-16 in aerial combat (i.e., before the F-16 saw it).

The chief reason the RCAF chose the F/A-18 Hornet over the F-16 35 years ago was because the Hornet had two engines and the Viper one. The second engine was supposed to be a margin of safety when flying over the high Arctic. But these past 35 years of practical experience have demonstrated the perfect reliability of the engine of the F-16. Furthermore, the F-35, which possesses only one engine, did not find its singularity an obstacle to acceptance by today’s RCAF. Looking back, choosing the F/A-18 over the F-16 was a mistake.

The solution to the Liberal government’s fighter dilemma is to fully embrace the interim idea. Perfect shouldn’t become the enemy of the good. New off the production line F-16Vs can fill the same role as the Hornet, and still be a relevant aircraft anywhere else in the world.

The government could buy F-16s in blocks of 20 at a time, with the intention of converting the RCAF over to that aircraft as its mainline fighter as the Hornets age out. The project would have a timeline of 20 years, with the intention of reviewing the status of fighter aircraft technology at that time. Commitment to the interim idea addresses the issue of retraining and multiple parts lists. Interim, in this case, means 20 years and not five.

Canada's Veterans Deserve A Courageous Ombudsman

“In six years, Parent has held just two press conferences”

(Volume 24-10)

Sean Bruyea

Canada’s military veterans are suffering another condition of late: envy. They watch National Defence Ombudsman Gary Walbourne relentlessly petition the government to improve the lives of soldiers. Veterans long for their Ombudsman, Guy Parent, to have the same backbone.

In six years, Parent has held just two press conferences unlike most other oversight appointees. He prefers his personal blog and the occasional news release as the primary vehicle for informing the public. Parent’s news release titled Budget 2017 Addresses Veterans Ombudsman’s Recommendations was characteristically hasty to compliment government before he knew the details of new programs: “I am pleased that the Government is taking my recommendations seriously and is moving forward on several of them.

His ownership of these recommendations also demeans advisory groups and countless suffering veterans who bravely went public with their harrowing experiences dealing with the federal bureaucracy. Most if not all of the ombudsman’s recommendations were made, often years prior, by these groups and advocates.

Disturbingly, Parent has been completely silent on the issue of suicides, leaving DND Ombudsman Gary Walbourne to aggressively attack the bureaucracy even though these were veterans killing themselves and, in one tragic case, killing others. Earlier this year, Mr. Walbourne was the fifth DND ombudsman to call for his office to be enshrined in law, reporting to Parliament, as opposed to being handcuffed as a ministerial advisor.

Parent has never made this appeal, preferring a buddy-to-the-minister approach that has rarely sparked bureaucrats into action. Six years into Parent’s mandate, systemic problems still plague the bureaucracy while inadequate programs afflict veterans and their families.

My first published column 12 years ago called for a veterans’ ombudsman and was widely cited in the Conservative platform that resulted in the establishment of Parent’s office. In fact, along with trailblazing advocates like Louise Richard, we were the first to publicly call for the creation of an independent office, not one beholden to the very Department it is mandated to oversee.

Veterans might consider overlooking Parent’s crime of sleeping with the political and bureaucratic enemy. However, Parent audaciously claims he is the “voice of veterans” while perpetuating and deepening divisions in the fragmented and suffering community. He attacked veterans and opposition parties in the media, accusing some of “misleading” veterans and the public then telling Canadians they are confused about how veterans are treated. He made these comments while the non-renewable terms of his appointment were quietly changed by the outgoing Harper regime. Parent was coincidentally renewed six months before his original appointment ended.

Parent praised the Conservative government for making “great strides” in helping veterans. He publicly stood beside former Minister O’Toole at the announcement of new programs, enthusiastically endorsing government and those programs when no one, including the minister, knew the details of whether the programs were of benefit to veterans. This highly suspect act alone should have prompted Parent’s removal.

A sycophantic agenda is repugnant for an “impartial, arms-length and independent officer.” When asked to resign by the current Liberal government, he refused. Meanwhile, former Minister of Veterans Affairs Kent Hehr remained silent. Parent’s performance, not to mention potentially breaching his professional ethical code, should have been scrutinized by both veterans and Parliament.

His recommendations are often just as confusing and meandering as the bureaucracy he claims to oversee. Furthermore, he takes credit for changes that likely would have occurred faster and more substantially without his office’s existence. His repeated fawning of government of any stripe allows bureaucracy to continue at its snail’s pace without worrying whether an ombudsman might bite them publicly. Ministers can claim they are listening to the “voice of veterans.”

Parent turns 70 this year and has never worked outside the military or public service culture since he was 17. Such lifelong deference to authority creates lapdogs that dare not violate the taboo of pushing government beyond polite reports and mostly ignored and ineffectual blog postings. He is not unlike most federal oversight officers in this regard who are bureaucrats asked to police bureaucrats. Such practice perpetuates wrongdoing and mismanagement and has widely been condemned in the private and public sector.

Nevertheless, it is time for Guy Parent to find another public service job.

Hands up!

“Now, if I’m a veteran, I’m getting a little concerned about this put-up-my-hands-and-get-help thing”

(Volume 24-09)

By Michael Nickerson

Who knew it was so simple? There you are, a veteran living on the street, or perhaps a veteran about to commit suicide. Maybe it hasn’t gotten that far. Maybe you’re just couch surfing, or borrowing from family while you wait for your benefits to finally come in. Or you’re still transitioning out of the service and wondering how it will all play out. Well, silly you. No need to worry. No need to fuss. And certainly no need to complain. Just put up your hand (assuming you still have one) and ask for help. For help my dear veteran, you shall receive.

But hey, don’t take my word for it. Take new (deep breath needed here) Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence Seamus O’Regan’s word for it. In a recent interview with the CBC, the freshly minted minister with the 10-word, 62-character job title was like any new kid on the job: effusive, optimistic, with lots to learn but ready to roll up his sleeves and get to work. And he had a message for the military veterans for whom he is now responsible, one that he repeated twice for emphasis: “If you need help, put up your hand and we will get you help.”

Well that sure simplifies things, doesn’t it? No multiple applications, reviews, legal battles, embarrassing interviews or long trips to the nearest Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) office somewhere in the next time zone. Wave a hand like you’re in grade school, and teacher O’Regan will give you a hall pass to the Promised Land.

Inspiring stuff that. And there is no shortage of people wanting to be inspired. Initial reaction to O’Regan’s promotion ranged from faith that a boy with some salt in his veins would understand the plight of veterans (who more often than not come from the east coast), to the simple fact that he’s buds with the prime minister. And let’s face it, he always seemed trustworthy on morning television, so how can things go anywhere but up?

As a quick refresher, Team Justin™ got itself elected, in part, on the promise that things would be different for Canada’s military veterans. The Harper Government™ used and abused you, but we will make things right, or so the narrative went.

First and foremost was a promise to restore lifetime pensions for wounded veterans instead of lump-sum payments instituted under the New Veterans Charter. That promise was made in 2015.

Fast forward two years and you would be hard-pressed to see which way is up, down, or just about anywhere worth planning on. Much has been made of the re-opening of nine VAC offices in the last year, though a year behind schedule. But the number of outstanding cases has risen and caseloads for overstretched front-line staff have not decreased.

A “strategy” to deal with veteran homelessness might be presented this fall (never mind actually doing something about it).

And the big promise, namely a return to lifetime pensions for injured veterans, is at best something that might be dealt with by the end of this year (though it’s not clear whether that’s the calendar year versus the fiscal year, the latter ending in March 2018).

Worrisome still is the fact that the new minister with the long job title but little experience has no idea what is happening with the single most important issue of his ministry. Asked if he knew whether the lump-sum policy would be replaced and what it would look like, he said he didn’t know but he’d be the one presenting the details by year’s end, or so he says he was told.

Now, if I’m a veteran, I’m getting a little concerned about this put-up-my-hands-and-get-help thing. New on the job or not, the new minister in charge has no idea  where things stand. He will wait to be told from on high what to say and do; all indications are he will be a mouthpiece, a seasoned emcee of some future presentation to be scheduled later.

Veterans are suffering. Veterans are dying. Veterans have been betrayed. So let’s have a show of hands … how many think there will be any change?

SAVING HMCS SACKVILLE: A Precious Piece Of RCN History

HMCS Sackville, the last surviving Flower-class corvette and  now serving as a museum ship in Halifax, Nova Scotia, is in dire need of urgent repairs or she will be lost forever. (andrew anderson)

(Volume 24-09)

By Peter Stoffer

A few months ago I wrote an op-ed piece called Battle of the Atlantic Place. This article was about a plan to permanently house Canada’s naval memorial, HMCS Sackville (K181), the last of the Royal Canadian Navy’s 123 corvettes, in a significant facility worthy of her status.

Unfortunately, the Sackville is in dire need of urgent repairs to the tune of $3- to $3.5-million, and the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust, a group of dedicated volunteers working to keep her history alive, simply just does not have the funds to pay for this.

We have been advised that the Navy of today is not in the heritage and memorial business anymore, which to me is very surprising considering that all military branches pay deep respect to their symbols and people of the past. They have various mess dinners, parades, solemn ceremonies like Remembrance Day, etc.

They even travel overseas on a regular basis to pay the country’s respect to our brave fallen. And recently the Vimy Memorial and the National Memorial underwent extensive renovations and upgrades. [This, in my view, was money well spent.]

Even the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa are undergoing extensive renovations and upgrades to the tune of over possibly $5-billion when all is said and done [again, I believe that to preserve these historic buildings this will be taxpayer money that is well spent].

And yet the Royal Canadian Navy or the government of the day, which funds and directs the Navy, cannot or will not [at the time of writing] see fit to spend the appropriate funds to see that Canada’s naval memorial is repaired and safe for future generations to see and relish in her glorious past.

The RCN’s Vimy Ridge

I remind the government of the day of what the Sackville represents.

She took part in the most significant and longest continuous battle of the Second World War. The Battle of the Atlantic not only saved and freed the Western world, the battle had a transformative change on Canadian society. We are the country we are today because of that six-year-long battle that took the lives of more than 4,600 Canadian sailors, airmen and merchant mariners. She is the last corvette of her kind and was built along with the others right here in Canada. She is the Navy’s Vimy Ridge and she deserves to be treated with the utmost respect and dignity.

The Canadian Naval Memorial Trust [of which I am a trustee] has been doing an amazing job over 30 years to not only help maintain the Sackville, but also to share her and Canada’s story to thousands and thousands of people both here in Canada and worldwide as well. This dedicated group of esteemed volunteers has given thousands upon thousands of volunteer hours to tell her story and just as importantly to tell the story of those who sailed her.

Also, every year during the first week of May a very touching and solemn event occurs onboard the vessel during the Battle of Atlantic ceremonies, whereby some of the honoured sailors who recently crossed the bar have their ashes buried at sea while aboard the Sackville.

For the families of these deceased heroes of Canada it is a fitting tribute to their memories.

So the Sackville and those who sailed her have done their job and the trustees have done theirs. Canada, it is now time for you to do the right by Sackville and see she gets the funding and repairs so that she can sail on to a future she deserves.

Bravo Zulu to all our women and men in service to our country … now and in the past.

We're Spending $60-Billion For What???

“... the only conceivable submarine fleet that would oppose Canada is the Russian one”

(Volume 24-09)

By Vincent J. Curtis

As reported by David Pugliese in Volume 24 Issue 7 of this magazine (“CSC: Forging Ahead”), the Trudeau Liberal government is committed to spending up to $60-billion to rebuild Canada’s surface combatant fleet. This is up from the original $26-billion the Harper Conservative government believed was necessary for the project.

Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan confirmed that the existing surface combatant fleet of frigates and destroyers will be replaced by “Fifteen [CSCs]. Not ‘up to’ 15 and not 12. And definitely not six, which is a number the previous government’s plan would have paid for, as the Parliamentary Budget Officer reported.”

At $4-billion each, these Canadian CSCs must be the most expensive lightweight punchers in human history.

Let’s compare. What could $60-billion buy in terms of combat ships today?

For $60-billion, Canada could buy 6 of the 100,000-ton Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. The U.S. Navy only has 10 of them, and they are the backbone of their carrier fleet.

For $60-billion Canada could buy 30 of the 9,000-ton Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. The United States presently has 64 of these on active service. When in April Prime Minister Trudeau urged the world community to seek justice in the chemical attack that Bashar al-Assad made against his own citizens, President Donald Trump dispatched two of these to deal with issue. If the RCN were similarly equipped, Mr. Trudeau would not have to wave his arms fecklessly and call for others to act in fulfilment of his virtue signalling. He could order it done himself.

For $60-billion, Canada could buy 11 of the brand new 78,000-ton Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers from the UK, which only plans to acquire two.

You get the idea. For $60-billion spent on naval construction, Canada could change the balance of naval power in the world.

But we won’t. For $60-billion Canada is going to acquire 15 5,000-ton CSCs, basically frigates, of limited combat power, speed, and range. These surface combatant ships are aptly designed to re-fight the Battle of the Atlantic, which pitted German U-boats against corvettes. Except the Germans are on our side now, and the only conceivable submarine fleet that would oppose Canada is the Russian one.

Russia is not well situated to interdict sea traffic across the North Atlantic and, besides, the United States submarine fleet has that problem addressed.

What our design program lacks is actual combat power. There is no doubt that frigates are necessary. But in today’s world, and for the next 20 to 30 years out, naval power is lacking in a hard-skinned fighting ship. For a middle power like Canada, this fighting ship takes the form of a 20,000- to 25,000-ton nuclear-powered battlecruiser carrying six 12-inch guns with plenty of deck space for Tomahawk cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, and air-defence and missile-defence guns. Nuclear power gives the ship unlimited range and enables a speed of over 30 knots. A battlecruiser is preferred because it is less technically sophisticated to operate than a carrier.

One of these would cost no more than a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, also nuclear powered. And one or two is all Canada would require.

Much as I love our East Coast shipbuilders, it is plainly cheaper for Canada to acquire its combatant ships abroad. The reason for placing orders for warships in Canadian shipyards is for domestic economic benefits, but in this case we need to look at a larger picture.

Canada is re-negotiating NAFTA with the Trump administration, and can expect a hard bargainer across the table. Sixty-billion dollars represents a huge bargaining chip on the Canadian side. In exchange for American concessions on the trade deal, Canada could place orders with American shipyards for Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers — a proven modern design with all the costs of development fully depreciated. We get a lot more combat power for our defence money, Canadian exporters retain or get freer access to U.S. markets, our marketing boards are left alone, and the East Coast shipbuilders get put on welfare.

Those are the economics of it. Our East Coast shipbuilders are too pricy for the naval combat power the rest of us have a right to expect. We might like our neighbourhood grocer, but we think nothing of shopping at Walmart for the better prices.

For $60-billion in expenditure, Canadian taxpayers have a right to expect serious naval combat power, and we won’t get it with 15 surface combatants.

Frenetic Freeland

"So cute the Freeland freak out. We're on it: We're investigating it"

(Volume 24-08)

By Michael Nickerson

We’ve got our best people on it. They’re working overtime. Don’t worry. When you start hearing phrases like that you can be sure of a few things: the best people haven’t been on it, until now they’ve been doing anything but working, and you have great reason to not just worry but think about getting heavily sedated. Be it your mechanic, your doctor, your lawyer, your internet provider, or possibly your veterinarian whose just misplaced your cat, the jig is obviously up. Whatever it is they say they’re on top of, they aren’t. They were just hoping nobody would notice.

So when Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland suddenly waxes eloquent about how “energetically” her staff is working on the Saudi file, specifically military arms sales to the House of Saud by Canadian manufacturers, one wonders just how “urgent” (to use another Freeland buzz word) the issue has really been. If you guessed not at all, then by gosh you’re getting the hang of this.

For those who missed it, here is the issue in a nutshell: Canada sells a lot of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, a country that accounted for some 20 per cent of Canadian military arms sales in 2016 alone. But thanks to a deal brokered by the Canadian Commercial Corporation (the “prime contractor” of record) for some $15-billion in light armoured (and weaponized) vehicles (or as Justin Trudeau flippantly called them in the 2015 election, “jeeps”) to be built and shipped off to Saudi, that percentage is about to go way up.

Now, in theory (and under Canadian law), the House of Saud isn’t supposed to use any of this weaponry to violate the human rights, or the basic vitality, of its citizens. One suspects they’re just supposed to drive them around for civic entertainment. But wouldn’t you know it, what in the age of smart phones and the internet, footage showed up of Saudi security forces doing just that: kicking serious citizenry ass with some fine, grade A Canadian made and approved equipment.

So cue the Freeland freak out. We’re on it; we’re investigating it; we’re getting all the facts; we’re voicing our concerns. We’re also negotiating a major trade agreement and are a little busy. But never you mind. As Freeland emphasized, “We are absolutely committed to the defence of human rights and we condemn all violations of human rights.”

Condemn perhaps; doing anything about it is another thing entirely. Since the day this deal was brokered, the rationalizing has been at best pathetic, at worst morally repugnant. From the idea that we have safeguards in place, that there are Canadian jobs at stake, and that we need to be on good terms with our Saudi friends, to the cynical creed that someone will sell it if we don’t, so let’s cash in, there has been a concerted effort to ignore the simple fact we are enabling a regime that is anathema to what Canadians supposedly stand for.

Whether it’s women’s rights (or lack thereof), a draconian legal system, suppression of  individual freedoms of expression, or a migrant worker system that borders on slavery, Saudi Arabia represents just about everything abhorrent to people in this country, yet has been a cash grab too hard for Canadian businesses and governments to ignore for decades. Even a Saudi proxy war in Yemen has failed to do more than generate mild rebuke, much less censure or economic sanctions and boycott.

That war has so far claimed ten thousand lives, displaced three million people, and lead to over 200,000 cholera cases and climbing, all since 2015, and much of that misery and devastation at the hands of our Saudi friends. Whether they use Canadian military equipment directly or indirectly in these atrocities should not matter. That we enable them in any way does.

Will a Trudeau government committed to human rights and overtures to peacekeeping finally just say no, and stop enabling and supporting a regime that has committed to anything but? Will our foreign affairs minister cancel the export permits of not just $15-billion in mobile armour, but all military sales to Saudi Arabia? I’m thinking there is going to be some energetic and urgent discussion on that subject. Probably some overtime too.

The Khadr Decision

“Regardless of what the Bush haters say, Khadr was not tortured ...”

(Volume 24-08)

By Vincent J. Curtis

I am long familiar with the Khadr case and the matter of Gitmo (aka the U.S. prison camp at Guantanamo, Cuba), having written about both beginning in 2008. My piece entitled “The Most Famous Canadian in Cuba,” for example, appeared in the June 2008 edition (Volume 15 Issue 5) of Esprit de Corps.

Permit me to shed some unwelcome light on the Omar Khadr matter, as none of the opinions published that I have seen appear to have taken into account the laws of armed conflict and, in particular, the third and fourth Geneva Conventions.

The purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to minimize destruction, death and suffering in war by placing legal boundaries. One of the boundaries is meant to clearly identify who is a combatant and who is not, and therefore who are attackable and who are not. Monte Cassino in Italy, for example, would not have been destroyed by the Allies during the Second World War but for the (erroneous) impression that the Germans were using it as a defensive post. Being a defensive position made Monte Cassino attackable, despite its being otherwise protected by the Convention. Chiselling with the Convention on the margins is no small matter.

Even by the generous standards of the fourth Geneva Convention, Omar Khadr was not a lawful combatant, though combatant he was. This does not make him a “child soldier” because he was not a soldier in the first place. Khadr in Afghanistan was a foreign national, and a civilian at the time he threw the grenade that killed Sgt Chris Speer on the battlefield. Khadr’s violating the Convention endangered the lives of lawful non-combatants.

By rights, Khadr could have been summarily executed on the battlefield, as some Germans were in WWII. He was not, because of the intelligence value he might have possessed. His intelligence value was all his life was worth until he was transported to Gitmo, where he fell under a different legal regime.

The detainees at Gitmo were called “detainees” and not “prisoners of war” because they did not qualify as POWs under the Geneva Convention. They were all either unlawful combatants or war criminals of some sort, but that they were all alive is due to the decisions of President George W. Bush. There were no legal precedents for fighting this kind of conflict.

Because of lack of precedents, the U.S. Congress enacted The Detainee Treatment Act (in 2005) and the Military Commissions Act (in 2006), which established military tribunals as a means of disposing of the cases of some of the Gitmo detainees. These Acts were consistent with the Eisentrager decision of 1950, which held that U.S. Courts had no jurisdiction over the handling of German POWs.

The price of Khadr’s release to Canada was that he admit he killed Chris Speer; we ask for nothing less from murderers under Canadian law before parole. Khadr admitted his guilt, and so was released to Canadian custody to serve out the sentence he received from the legally competent tribunal. That Khadr now recants his admission while safe in Canada impresses me not at all.

Regardless of what the Bush haters say, Khadr was not tortured — if that word is to have real meaning. He was not waterboarded, the most extreme practice, which was retrospectively determined by the Obama Administration to be torture. Khadr says he was heavily interrogated and frightened in order to deliver what intelligence he might possess, but that intelligence was why he was still alive. (The Manchester Document makes me skeptical of his claims.) That strong measures were employed during his interrogation is a sign to me that he resisted answering questions. His treatment would have been different had he been forthcoming with answers.

The business of Khadr’s receiving $10-million from Canadian taxpayers is connected to the Supreme Court of Canada’s distaste for Gitmo and that Khadr was interrogated there by CSIS agents.

The Supreme Court of Canada weighed in on the Khadr matter in a way that demonstrated fatuousness in my eyes. It opined that Khadr’s rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated. I’m sorry, but Khadr was in the custody of Uncle Sam, who is under no obligation to uphold Canadian rights. One reason for using Gitmo was to prevent the American legal system from meddling in these military matters per Eisentrager, and as the U.S. Supreme Court largely upheld in its Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision of 2004. (Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, which gave U.S. courts some jurisdiction, and a condition of his Habeas release was that he renounce his citizenship and accept deportation to Saudi Arabia. Hamdi departed without money or apology.)

As for Khadr’s interrogation by CSIS agents, under what conditions could the Canadian government ascertain for itself Khadr’s condition in Gitmo? Khadr, a Canadian citizen who committed an act of war against America, represented a delicate diplomatic matter between the Bush administration and the Chrétien government, and demanding he be visited by a Canadian diplomat would have been unproductive. The CSIS route was workable because it did not impugn the Bush administration. Khadr’s prior treatment at American hands immediately before he was questioned by CSIS does not make Canada complicit.

The Nuremburg trials gave the legal profession the idea that war ought to be brought under the jurisdiction of the legal profession. We saw in Yugoslavia and the Kosovo campaign how disastrous meddling lawyers can be in war.

In his Boumediene dissent, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia complained of “an inflated notion of judicial supremacy” and mocked the majority’s worry about “areas in which the legal determination of the other branches will be (shudder!) supreme.”

Inflated notions of its importance is what led our Supreme Court to favour Khadr. That meddling, and our political branch’s apology and payout in the face of it, is leading to diplomatic issues because Canada is seen as officially unmindful of Khadr’s illegal act of war.

Liberals Must Pull The Plug On Sordid Saudi Arms Deal

“... the Liberal government has cycled through an array of excuses ...”

(Volume 24-8)

By Peggy Mason

With videos emerging on social media of Canadian armoured vehicles being used in a violent crackdown against the Shia minority in Eastern Saudi Arabia, the controversy over our $15-billion arms deal with one of the world’s most repressive regimes has resurfaced with a vengeance.

This sordid saga has featured prominently in Canadian media since at least January 2015, when the Saudis carried out a brutal public flogging of a young blogger, Rauf Badawi, whose family had sought refuge in Quebec, after his imprisonment for proposing an online dialogue on religious matters. The new journalistic focus on the terrible human rights record of Saudi Arabia stood in sharp contrast to the relative lack of media critique when the mammoth deal was actually concluded by the Harper government in early 2014. This was despite an outcry from human rights groups like Amnesty International Canada, Project Ploughshares and the Rideau Institute.

Canadian and international media attention was further heightened when the richest Arab nation — Saudi Arabia — invaded the poorest — Yemen — in early 2015, followed almost immediately by credible allegations of war crimes being committed. Reports came from organizations like Oxfam, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that the Saudis were deliberately, even wantonly, targeting civilians in schools, markets, hospitals, funerals and wedding parties. The Netherlands and Sweden halted their arms deals with Saudi Arabia amid calls by the European Parliament for a total embargo. By October of 2016 the United Nations was condemning Saudi war crimes in Yemen.

The sale of heavily weaponized armoured vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia blatantly contradicts Canadian export policy guidelines which came into force in 1986. Those guidelines restrict the export of military equipment to “countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.” [Emphasis added]

It is also worth noting that the broader context of this controversy includes a Liberal campaign promise to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty, which enshrines international standards for arms exports, and a stated intention to play a bigger role in support of the UN — including seeking a term on the Security Council in 2021–2022) and championing human rights and multilateral diplomacy.

Since the intense scrutiny over the deal began, the Liberal government has cycled through an array of excuses, beginning with “It‘s a done deal; we are bound by it or our reputation as a reliable partner will suffer.” Then disclosure of documents in a legal challenge to the sale revealed that it was not the Harper government but Liberal Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion who, in April 2016, had approved six export permits, covering more than 70 per cent of the total transaction. Suddenly the main public rationale became the lack of hard evidence of actual human rights violations by Saudi Arabia using Canadian equipment, backed up by the profoundly immoral catch-all — ‘if we don’t sell to them, others will.’

Even more troubling was the private rationale — that is, the departmental justification for its recommendation to the minister that he approve the export permits. In what can only be described as Orwellian logic, the memo stated that a new generation of Canadian-made LAVs would “help Saudi Arabia counter instability in Yemen.” If anyone wants proof of the impact of 10 years of Harper depredations on the capacity of the Canadian foreign service to promote human rights and international law, surely they need look no further than this!

Dion, after repeated grillings in the House of Commons and in press scrums, did finally concede that he would rescind the permits if actual evidence emerged that the Canadian LAVs were being used to violate human rights.

The legal challenge foundered on Government of Canada assurances that no hard evidence of misuse of Canadian equipment existed. Mere days later, while that decision was being appealed, the social media images of Canadian armoured vehicles appeared.

Neither the Canadian company in question nor the government sought to deny that the equipment was Canadian, and Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland announced an immediate investigation. Subsequent statements by the Saudi government seeking to justify its actions confirmed the use of Canadian equipment including LAVs.

Polling conducted in early 2017 — before the revelations of actual use of Canadian military equipment against Saudi civilians — found that a majority of Canadians oppose this arms deal, and believe it should be cancelled, despite potential job losses. It would seem they agree with the very sensible proposition that Canadian jobs should not depend on the maiming and killing of innocent civilians.

To argue otherwise is to invite the question, Where will we draw the line? If potential complicity in war crimes is not a step too far, then what is?

And let us not forget that there are a number of practical steps the Liberal government can take to mitigate the economic impact of cancelling the deal, not least of which is to speed up the purchase by National Defence of this new generation of LAVs.

Even the architects of the original deal, the Conservatives, are now calling for the cancellation of the export permits.

It seems painfully clear, however, that the Liberal government is hoping to ride out the storm.

But a wide range of Canadian civil society organizations, aided by superb investigative journalism, are unwilling to let that happen. There will need to be Committee hearings on Bill C-47, the draft legislation amending Canada’s Export and Import Permits Act, to prepare for Canada’s accession to the Arms Trade Treaty. Those hearings will allow opposition parties and civil society experts alike to keep the Saudi arms deal in the public eye. And so will the growing international media focus on the Canadian deal including several Al Jazeera reports and an upcoming BBC documentary

The Liberal government still has time to turn this debacle around and make the right decision. That means cancelling all further deliveries of LAVs and related armoured vehicles and other such equipment to Saudi Arabia and any other country where similar risks arise. With the moral vacuum in the Trump White House now impossible to ignore, it is all the more important that human rights and international law are at the forefront of Canadian international policy.

When It's Just A Game

“It’s also safe to say Foster Hewitt would have been a little tongue-tied calling the ‘play’ given the messy aftermath.”

(Volume 24-7)

By Michael Nickerson

He shoots, he scores! No, I’m not trying to conjure images of Sidney Crosby and the Golden Goal from the 2010 Olympics. Nor, with all due respect to the memory of Foster Hewitt, am I referring to hockey at all. I’m referring to the recent world record-breaking shot by an unnamed member of Canada’s JTF2. Put the biscuit in the basket as the saying goes, though from a lot farther away than your NHL-mandated blue line.

How far, might you ask? Around 3,540 metres give or take, which as many are saying, is quite a shot … eat your heart out Bobby Hull. Of course, the biscuit in this case is not a six-ounce puck of vulcanized rubber but a .50 caliber BMG round. And the basket was not a four-by-six hockey net but a purported member of ISIL of indeterminate size, though it’s safe to assume taller than four feet, and a lot skinnier than six. It’s also safe to say Foster Hewitt would have been a little tongue-tied calling the “play” given the messy aftermath.

Now to be clear, from a military and professional soldier’s point of view, this was indeed an accomplishment of the highest order. To hit a target from that distance given the variables involved is a testament to not just the skill, but the physical and mental training put in by the sniper who achieved it. That the target was a living, breathing human being makes it, again from a soldier’s perceptive, all the more impressive. This wasn’t a great shot on some shooting range, but a life-taking shot under combat conditions, taken under the direction of the Canadian government; by definition Canadian citizens. That’s one hell of a thing to ask someone to do, and our soldiers do it very well and without fanfare. It deserves our deepest respect.

That we had a sniper in that place at that time, taking that shot and that life, should make every citizen of this country feel very ashamed. The target should never have been there, ISIL should never have existed in the first place. These situations have resulted from one stupid decision after another, by our government and others; an ongoing string of incompetence for which year after year, decade after decade, and century after century our soldiers have had to pay the price. It is not something to be celebrated like a Stanley Cup parade or an extra big haul of medals from the last Olympics. Our soldiers deal with the messes we cause. There’s nothing for Canadian civilians to feel remotely proud about.

Not that you would know it. Media outlets were falling over themselves talking about the achievement, lauding it, deconstructing it, listing the top five long-distance kills in the world and squealing with glee that Canada has three of them! Firearm enthusiasts in chat rooms and ranges across the land parsed the whole thing like an exceptional Tiger Woods golf shot while pondering the merits of various rifles and rounds like they were new offerings from Nike™ and Titleist™. Even the prime minister chimed in with kudos and pompoms, covering his political bases and ass if not necessarily his elected duties or responsibilities.

Yet why should he if the general electorate treats the whole thing as one big, jingoistic game? I don’t know how many times I’ve heard coaches and athletes in hockey and other sports use military and war metaphors to refer to a play, a game, a series, or a season. Similarly, there are far too many people in this country who live vicariously and salve their insecurities not just through the distraction of organized sport, but through the bloody conflicts around the world, and the true bravery of soldiers forced to deal with them.

And deal with them they will until people understand that it is no game. These aren’t just scores and records from some benign, entertaining competition. It’s not the Olympics; it’s not the Stanley Cup. It’s somebody’s child killing someone else’s child, for real, never to be taken back on appeal. Game over.

The JTF2 Heard you, Scott

“The top Canadian sniper of the war was Cpl Francis Pegahmagabow, 1st Battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force, with 378 kills with his Ross.”

(Volume 24-07)

By Vincent J. Curtis

For some time now, publisher Scott Taylor has criticized the Canadian government for allowing Canadian soldiers to fight in the front lines in Iraq against ISIS forces. One example of front-line fighting was of a Canadian soldier taking out a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) with a relatively short-range Carl Gustav rocket launcher. The Canadian troops deployed in Iraq are on a training mission, and fighting in the front lines runs contrary to that agreed-upon mandate, he argues.

It appears that Canadian Special Operations Forces in Iraq were paying attention. In June, a Canadian JTF2 sniper made a record-breaking kill shot in Iraq from a twice-confirmed range of 3,540 metres. You can’t get much further behind the front lines than that. Any further back, and you’d bump into the Iraqi Officer’s Mess.

Canadian snipers now hold three of the top five confirmed sniper shots. Dropped into second place, with a range of 2,475 metres, is British sniper Corporal of Horse Craig Harrison of the Blues and Royals, followed by Canadians Cpl Rob Furlong at 2,430, and MCpl Arron Perry at 2,310, both of 3 PPCLI. Fifth place, at 2,300 meters, is held by Sgt Bryan Kremer, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment of the United States Army. The famous Gunnery Sergeant Carlos Hathcock III, U.S. Marine Corps, falls into sixth place at a mere 2,286 metres, albeit made with a scope-mounted M2 Browning machine gun — not ordinarily considered to be a sniping weapon, until he made it into one.

The first Canadian experience of sniping occurred during the Boer War. The Boers were armed with the Mauser Model 1895 that fired the 7mm Mauser spitzer cartridge. This combination completely outclassed and out-ranged the British Magazine Lee Enfield rifle, which fired the Mark II .303 cartridge — hard-hitting but ballistically wanting. The Boers were largely an army of snipers, and it was this experience that gave Sir Charles Ross and Sir Sam Hughes the idea of an army of marksmen equipped with a rifle superior in accuracy and range to the Mauser — the Ross rifle in .280 Ross calibre — and with the Colt M1895 machine gun included for additional firepower.

The British learned some lessons too from the Boer War, and they entered World War I with the Mark VII .303 cartridge and the Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle. Under Sam Hughes’ tutelage, Canadians stayed with the Ross, adapted for the improved British cartridge. Major H. Hesketh-Prichard, author of Sniping in France, gives his account of “How the British Army Won the Sniping War in the Trenches.”

He writes: “The Canadian Division and, later, the Canadian Corps was full of officers who understood how to deal with the German sniper, and early in the war there were Canadian snipers who were told off to this duty [i.e. counter-sniping], and some of them were extraordinarily successful. Corporal, afterwards, Lieutenant, Christie, of the PPCLI, was one of the individual pioneers of sniping.”

In his book A Rifleman Went to War, W.H. McBride wrote of pre-war Canadian training. “Here, in Canada, the program, which was certainly laid out by an officer who knew his business (I suspect it was Colonel Hughes himself) was one calculated to do just two things: to put the men in physical condition to endure long marches and to thoroughly train them in the use of weapons … In the Battalion were many of the best riflemen in Canada, including Major Elmitt (member of the Canadian Palma team of 1907) … I just mention these things to show how it was that this particular battalion developed into a real aggregation of riflemen … We were using the Ross rifle, a splendid target weapon …”

The top Canadian sniper of the war was Cpl Francis Pegahmagabow, 1st Battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force, with 378 kills with his Ross.

In World War II, Canadian snipers were equipped with a scope-mounted Lee-Enfield No. 4 Mk 1 (T) and organized into scout-sniper platoons. Perhaps the most famous picture of a sniper, then or now, is of Sgt Harold A. Marshall of the Calgary Highlanders, wearing a Denison smock and a Hollywood-handsome look.

In 1972, the Canadian army adopted the C3 Parker Hale, which was based upon a modern target-competition rifle with all the latest improvements for consistent, long-range accuracy. This excellent rifle was in combat service as late as Operation APOLLO, and MCpl Graham Ragsdale of 3 PPCLI recorded over 20 kills with a C3A1 in Afghanistan in March 2002.

The 7.62 NATO calibre C3A1 is being phased out and replaced with the C14 Timberwolf, in .338 Lapua Magnum. The problem with all the classic rifle calibres for sniping nowadays is lack of range. They are limited in effectiveness to the distance at which the bullet falls below the speed of sound, and this typically occurs about 900 metres downrange. Better ballistics dramatically improves range. The Lapua Magnum cartridge is good to 1,500 metres, and the .50 calibre BMG, to over 1,800 metres; and the extraordinary multi-kilometres kills were done with these.

The problem for accurate, long-range sniping becomes accounting for such esoteric factors as atmospheric pressure, and the curvature and speed of rotation of the earth. For this, the sniper’s spotter and his ballistic computer become an absolutely essential part of the team.

The idea of Sam Hughes and Charles Ross of an army of marksmen proved to be impractical, and precise, long-range shooting is now delegated to platoons of snipers with special equipment. Beginning with Hughes, the Canadian Army developed a culture, and now has a reputation for excellence in sniping. Sniping is a skill that is inexpensive to develop. It is a craft that smaller armies like Canada’s, lacking in money and men, can cultivate, and snipers can deliver tactically important results.

With modern tools, Canadian soldiers don’t have to be in no man’s land to be able to dispatch the enemy.

Not Even Worth The Papers It's Printed On

“Vote Team Justin™ and get your money! Sound familiar?”

(Volume 24-06)

By Michael Nickerson

It’s finally here! The new Canadian defence policy paper has arrived. Huzzah! Sure it’s six months late, but oh my, what a document: 113 pages of vision, inspiration, and no end of sidebars, tables, and appendices to wow the reader into a state of optimistic bliss. It’s got a catchy title too: Strong, Secure, Engaged. And hey, it also has a great photo of a military family with their dog, and who doesn’t like dogs?

As a body of rhetoric goes, it is quite impressive, touching on all the right talking points, from supporting military personnel and their families, and investing in capability and capacity, to “Fixing Defence Funding” as the third chapter is titled. The first two at the very least indicate that Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and the rest of Team Justin™ have indeed been listening to Canadians, be it through consultation, focus groups, or a daily summary of press clippings. And it’s fairly safe to say that, after many years, the Canadian public wants us to look after our troops and families better, and knows that our military is in need of a serious financial infusion.

And so, should one view Strong, Secure, Engaged as a contractual agreement, then the military community has a lot to be happy about. Aside from expanding regular force and reserve numbers by 3,500 and 1,500 respectively, those personnel will receive more money for family support resource centres ($145-million), and more for health and wellness, both physical and mental ($200-million). Twenty-eight initiatives in all that should have military members thinking that, yes, they really like us.

Similarly, should you be part of the Royal Canadian Air Force or Navy, looking to join the Special Operation Forces, or are just a tech geek who likes to play cyber spy, then put those shades on because the future is going to be blazingly bright. We’ve been promised 88 jet fighters, 15 “Surface Combatant ships” (and to quote Sajjan: “Fifteen. Not ‘up to’ 15 and not 12. And definitely not six”), two supply ships, 605 Special Operation Force members and the requisite capital support, along with drones, radar, equipment upgrades across the board, and cyber warfare tech to boot.

Unfortunately given all its inspirational eloquence, Strong, Secure, Engaged is not a contractual agreement but is at best a promissory note backed by a history of broken promises and misleading numbers. Of course, the broken promises need no introduction, with a succession of governments having promised one thing and done effectively the opposite for decades. And it should come as no surprise that the spending promises in Strong, Secure, Engaged are heavily back-loaded to well after the next election. Vote Team Justin™ and get your money! Sound familiar?

Which brings us to the numbers, and to paraphrase the old saying, they aren’t what they’re cracked up to be. To quote the great document itself, the government promises (assuming they’re re-elected at least twice) to increase annual defence spending “from $18.9 billion in 2016-17 to $32.7 billion in 2026-27, an increase of over 70 percent.” Seventy per cent! Wow!! Who could quibble with that?

Well, what if I told you that the government, to great fanfare, has come forward and promised to spend the equivalent of no more annually in ten years than it does now? See, there’s this little thing called inflation and, unfortunately, when it comes to equipping and maintaining a modern, cutting-edge military force worthy of working with our current high-tech allies, the expected inflation rate runs a little higher than the annual increase in the price of kumquats at the local grocer. Put simply, using the government’s numbers, their promise amounts to an annual increase of 5.65 per cent (compounded annually, which is charitable), and while the inflation of defence costs can be quite variable, dependent on tech levels and operational status amongst other things, 5.65 per cent yearly in cost inflation is well within the accepted norms for modern militaries.

In short, Strong, Secure, Engaged isn’t even worth the paper it’s printed on. A work of fiction, smoke and mirrors … choose whatever analogy, but the result is the same, and so is Canadian military spending for many years to come.

Peacekeeping In Europe

“Maintaining the peace in Europe is by far Canada’s higher priority ...”

(Volume 24-06)

By Vincent J Curtis

The election of the Justin Trudeau government in 2015 brought with it hopes in some for a return to international peacekeeping as a prestigious feature of Canadian foreign policy. Attention was focussed on a mission in Africa, and the West African nation of Mali in particular. None of the peacekeeping opportunities were, on second look, particularly appealing. Despite pressure from the United Nations, the Trudeau government has not committed itself to any large-scale peacekeeping intervention in Mali, or anywhere else in Africa.

With good reason. In the first place, it is not in Canada’s national interest to have Canadian soldiers keeping peace among the warring tribes of Africa. Whereas it is in Canada’s national interests to keeping the peace among the warring tribes … of Europe.

To say nothing of national interest, the obvious racialism involved in having Canadian soldiers patrolling the African bush to keep the tribesmen from killing each other presents no winning visuals and a real danger of a loss of prestige as a result of some incident.

Even at two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defence, Canada lacks the military strength to supply a peacekeeping mission in Africa and a mission of deterrence in Europe. In Afghanistan, we were stretched to maintain a full-strength battalion and a brigade headquarters in Kandahar indefinitely; subtract an additional battalion from the reserves for a mission elsewhere, and something would have had to give in short order.

Maintaining the peace in Europe is by far Canada’s higher priority, and we have to husband what military strength we have in order to keep that peace.

One of the threats to the peace of Europe comes from the Putin regime of Russia. Russia is an interesting socio-political case. For 70 years, as the heart and soul of the Soviet Union, Russia represented the sacred flame of communism and official atheism to the world. When the fraud of communism could no longer be maintained, the Soviet empire collapsed, leaving Russia shorn even of her Czarist imperial lands. There must be a huge emptiness in the psychological core of the Russian people right now.

The country went into serious demographic decline. The population of ethnic Russians shrank. Of a total population of now less than 150 million, only 120 million are ethnic Russians. The average lifespan of a Russian is falling, and alcoholism and corruption are said to be rampant. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Canada’s. She relies heavily on exports of oil and gas for foreign exchange, and with depressed prices for both those commodities, her capacity to import foreign goods is not what it was a decade ago, when oil and gas prices were more than double what they are now.

Putin faces a huge challenge in getting a demoralized Russian people turned around, and he turned instinctively to the prestige game. He believes that the fall of the Soviet Union was a great geopolitical disaster. The role he is playing to the Russian people is that of the Strong Czar, which is distinct from the Good Czar. Putin is exercising Russia’s military strength to regain lands which once comprised the Czarist empire: in Georgia, Crimea, and in eastern Ukraine. He is menacing the Baltic states. In addition, he is propping up the Assad regime in Syria, and is supplying Iran with missile defences. Russian air forces are testing the NORAD defences again, and are buzzing NATO warships in the Baltic and the Black Seas.

Putin is doing the things that dictators typically do in order to distract attention from internal domestic problems: create international problems that justify internal oppression and distract attention from the internal issues. The Good Czar would undertake the thankless and personally dangerous task of a spiritual revival in Russia; the Strong Czar creates and carefully manages external problems.

Publisher Scott Taylor has observed that Russia is in no position to attack and conquer Europe. Russia has recently cut military expenditures even as NATO countries are being encouraged to increase theirs. By comparison, Germany has a population of 82 million and a GDP nearly triple that of Russia. True, Russia still has a large nuclear force that could reduce Western Europe to a nuclear wasteland; but what’s the point of trying to rule a nuclear wasteland?

The threat that Russia represents under the Putin regime is the nibbling at the edges of NATO, and a consequent loss of prestige of that organization that would follow should he succeed. The seizure and forced incorporation of all the Ukraine would create diplomatic tidal waves that NATO could do nothing about. Such a move, if successful, could cement Putin’s standing in Russian history while diminishing NATO’s prestige at the same time.

On the other hand, an attempt at seizing one of the Baltic states would create a far more ticklish problem for both Putin and NATO. If, say, NATO member Latvia were seized in a lightning invasion, NATO would be faced with a fait accompli and NATO countries would have to ask themselves how much they were prepared to risk for the sake of a country of less than two million people and territory not vital to the security of the rest of NATO.

That is why deterrence in Europe is central to Canadian foreign policy. We don’t want to have to answer that question in respect of the Baltic states, and would greatly prefer a stabilization of the Ukraine/Crimea problem. Only military deterrence can inhibit a seizure of Latvia, and military measures that can make a seizure less than lightning fast contribute to the stability of Europe. Putin is not going to risk all his prestige on a less than sure thing.

A force of 450 troops in the Baltic states is a start. Providing those troops with real defensive power with plentiful machine guns and anti-tank weapons will be the next step. Diplomatically, Canada can encourage a spiritual revival of the Russian people through engagement with the Russian Orthodox Church and encouragement of the spread of the Western enlightenment through cultural exchanges, rendering the prestige game moot. We can’t do this if we are busy putting out brush fires in Africa.

Moore's Law Of Terrorism

“The main objective of a terrorist group is to propagate its message”

(Volume 24-6)

By Stewart Webb

The recent string of lone wolf attacks in Britain cannot be fully explained away because they occurred during the month of Ramadan. One of the Ramadan-related inspirations is that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi decreed the formation of the ISIS caliphate during that month. There has been a correlation between an increase of ISIS-related attacks worldwide and the month of Ramadan for a couple of years so far. Nor should the London attack be dismissed as being solely inspired because of the Manchester attack.

Lone wolf attacks have occurred in the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Germany, France, Belgium and the list could go on. So could the list of attackers and their victims.

The true threat of lone wolf attacks stems from the proselytizing of Islamic extremism over the Internet and in any public sphere. On the Internet, extremist preachers connect to individuals who might be sympathetic. The Manchester bomber, Salman Abedi, may have had links to a former Ottawa extremist preacher, Abdul Baset Ghwela, who now resides in Libya. This only echoes the Fort Hood incident where Major Nidal Hasan was influenced by al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.

Extremist clerics and preachers will not stop trying to sway these disillusioned citizens who do not fit in with society and their peers as they seek for an accepting community and/or adventure. Of course, we could crack down on extremist preachers, but this would also place our freedom of expression at risk.

Unfortunately, extremist preachers are not the only threat online. There is a myriad of al-Qaeda and ISIS magazines that espouse their positions, and offer do-it-yourself guides to bombs or suggestions such as rent a van and drive it into a crowd. Then there is YouTube, Twitter and any other social media platforms where their propaganda can be still sought out. We have to also remember that the first six ISIS magazines of Dabiq were available for purchase on Amazon.

As technology has advanced so has terrorism, and it seems that we are still trying to catch up. The main objective of a terrorist group is to propagate its message, and embracing the Internet has proven to be fruitful. Welcome to Moore’s Law of Terrorism. For those who are not familiar with it, Intel co-founder Gordon Moore has predicted that transistor power will continue to double and markedly increase and thus pave the way for technological advancements. Terrorism has embraced the Internet, social media and public relations — from the Bora Bora to the PR room.

Facebook, Google, YouTube and Twitter have attempted to crack down on terrorist propaganda, but they have not been able to be successful. In fact, when many ISIS sympathizer Twitter users are blocked, they see it as a badge of honour, create a new account and reach out to their old contacts and re-form the connection. And the measures undertaken by the digital super-giants can be overcome by downloading a new browser, adopting a VPN or even just installing an advanced ad blocker. The United Kingdom created its own unit that will use psychological operations and social media.

It would be easy to blame the digital shift of inspiring western citizens solely on ISIS, but it would be wrong. Since the inception of al-Qaeda, even in the days of dial-up modem connections, there has been an Internet following. The first jihadist sympathetic website,
www.azzam.com, was launched by a London Kings College student. It rose in global notoriety and provided English-language updates on international jihadist activities. It was eventually shut down shortly after the 9/11 attacks. But this did not stop the ringleader of the July 7 attack in London in having copies of some of Azzam’s texts on martyrdom.

Of course the proselytizing message does not only land on ears of those willing to lay down their lives. The message is also heard by those who will only offer material support. For many, the first example that will pop in their minds is the DC transit cop that was trying to send prepaid credit cards to ISIS only to find himself in an FBI sting operation.

Then there is Jubair Ahmed, a Pakistani-American who was sentenced to 12 years in prison for offering material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba. For those who aren’t familiar with the Pakistani group, they were responsible for the Mumbai attacks and the Indian Parliament bombing in 2001. Ahmed starting providing recruitment and propaganda videos to the group from raw footage that was sent to him.

Imagine a world where ISIS and other groups outsource their propaganda films through the dark web. Or hackers find solutions on the battlefield. A U.S. Predator drone over Iraq was hacked in 2009 and the insurgents on the ground only used software available on the Internet for $26.

Sometimes it does seem we are falling behind. This is not the new age of terror, but just a minor step forward. We have to remember that, in this fight, they will adapt and so will we and it is going to be a long slog.