Will Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy Deliver What It Promised?

Turning policy commitments into operational capability and enduring Canadian companies

By Deepak Dutt, Founder and CEO, Zighra Inc.

Canada has made an ambitious commitment to rebuild its defence industrial base. The harder question is whether that ambition will translate into operational capability—and into enduring Canadian companies capable of delivering it.

The Defence Industrial Strategy launched in February 2026 established a welcome direction. Its Build-Partner-Buy framework, the Defence Investment Agency, expanded defence financing and new industrial initiatives all point toward a common objective: strengthening Canada’s ability to develop, own and sustain the capabilities essential to its security.

For the Canadian firms working in emerging technologies the problem has rarely been a shortage of ideas. It has been the gap between showing that something works and having a credible way for the Canadian Armed Forces to buy it and keep using it.

We are reasonably good at creating places to demonstrate technology. Challenges, sandboxes, pilots and experimentation let companies sit with users and prove a system functions. What they do not reliably create is a path onward. A mature capability can finish a pilot and still land back at the start of another procurement process, with no obvious next step. Large primes can absorb that uncertainty. A Canadian technology company spending its own engineering time and private capital often cannot, and the Forces end up watching proven technology remain outside the inventory.

In short, Canada does not have an innovation problem so much as it has a transition problem.

From priorities to predictable demand

The strategy itself recognized that companies need long-term demand signals if they are going to invest. The practical test is whether those signals ever become concrete enough to plan against.

In fields such as artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, Counter-UAS, resilient positioning, navigation and timing, autonomy and advanced sensing, the technology moves faster than conventional procurement cycles. Companies therefore need more than a general sense of what problems interest the CAF; they need to know which capabilities Canada actually expects to buy and roughly when. Even that is incomplete, because some of those capabilities will change while the paperwork is still moving. The model, technique or threat profile that looked decisive at the start of a multi-year process may no longer be the one that matters when the system finally arrives, which is why procurement has to look at both current performance and a supplier’s ability to keep learning, integrating new data and adapting.

Publishing prioritized near- and medium-term needs, wherever security allows, would give firms something to hire and build against. Without it, industry is asked to spend money ahead of government while guessing where government intends to go.

The Defence Drone Initiative and the $2.3 billion over five years in funding for uncrewed and counter-uncrewed systems proposed in Budget 2026 are real attempts to narrow that gap. Whether they succeed will depend on how predictable and sustained they remain, and on whether they are actually connected to acquisition rather than left as stand-alone signals.

From successful testing to operational adoption

Canada has begun creating the mechanisms needed to move defence innovation beyond experimentation. Programs such as IDEaS and Innovative Solutions Canada have demonstrated the value of testing emerging technologies with government users. The Pathway to Commercialization, the Defence Drone Initiative and the procurement reforms envisioned under the Defence Industrial Strategy are important steps toward connecting innovation with acquisition.

The challenge now is to make those pathways work consistently and at the speed operational requirements demand. Successful testing should lead to a timely decision: acquisition, broader operational evaluation, integration into an existing capability, or a clear determination not to proceed. Evidence generated through previous government testing should inform subsequent procurement decisions rather than requiring companies to repeatedly demonstrate what has already been established.

Government funding helps develop technology. Government procurement determines whether that technology becomes an operational capability. Canada must connect the two more effectively, ensuring that strategically important Canadian innovations can move from successful validation into sustained military use. Otherwise, the country risks building an innovation system that produces impressive demonstrations without fully capturing their operational and industrial value.

Capital depth is part of sovereignty

A third issue gets less attention than it deserves: capital. Strategic technologies do not only come from large companies. In AI, electronic warfare, autonomy, Counter-UAS, advanced sensing and defence software, a meaningful advantage can start with a small engineering team and a different algorithm or architecture. The company may still be small; the technology does not have to be.

That distinction matters because Canadian firms developing sovereign technology are no longer competing only against other technologies. They are also competing against other balance sheets. A thesis backed by $10 million does not move at the same speed, or with the same resilience, as one backed by hundreds of millions or billions. Capital decides how many engineers can work a problem, how fast the system can be iterated, how much capacity can be built before demand arrives, and how long a company can survive the procurement calendar. Over time it does more than finance technology; it gives a particular technical point of view the chance to become consequential.

The $6-billion BDC Defence Platform, the newer NRC-IRAP defence investments, regional initiatives and CDIR are useful pieces of the strategy. The opportunity is to connect them into a continuum that carries important technologies from R&D through deployment, production and export. Financial capital and customer capital have to work together: funding lets a company build, procurement creates operational credibility, and a Canadian military reference customer helps turn a domestic firm into a supplier that can compete abroad.

A more uncertain continental environment

Canada’s defence industrial base has long relied on deeply integrated North American supply chains, and that relationship remains essential. Recent trade tensions have also shown that even relationships once treated as predictable can be disrupted by politics and economics. This does not reduce the importance of working with the United States or with other close allies; it simply raises the value of having more resilient capacity at home.

Canada will continue to buy from and partner with allies, as it should. Some capabilities and industrial capacities cannot and need not be recreated domestically. Partnering with global champions and building Canadian champions are different objectives, and a serious industrial strategy has to be able to do both.

Three things Canada can do now

None of this requires another strategy document. Three practical moves would change the picture quickly.

First, turn priorities into demand that companies can actually see and plan against. Recurring publication of near- and medium-term capability requirements would help industry invest against real Canadian needs rather than intermittent signals. The Defence Drone Initiative and the $2.3 billion over five years proposed in Budget 2026 for uncrewed and counter-uncrewed systems are examples of the kind of focus that can work, provided they stay sustained and are clearly linked to acquisition pathways.

Second, make the transition from successful testing to operational adoption predictable and accountable. Successful experimentation should lead to a timely decision, and prior government testing should count as evidence rather than being reset to zero.

Third, put enough capital and customer opportunity behind the Canadian technologies that are strategically important. Connecting R&D funding, growth capital, operational testing, procurement and export support is what lets a promising technology become an industrial capability.

Not every Canadian company is strategically important, not every patent is an advantage, and Canadian ownership alone should never be enough to win a contract. The harder work is identifying the technologies that can create lasting operational and industrial advantage, and recognizing them early enough for the recognition to matter.

Canada is preparing to invest extraordinary amounts in rebuilding its military over the coming decade. Those investments can do more than acquire equipment. They can help establish Canadian companies with the technological depth, operational credibility and financial strength to compete globally.

The Defence Industrial Strategy has already articulated the right ambition: build Canadian champions, strengthen sovereign intellectual property, create predictable demand and use procurement strategically. The challenge now is to recognize strategically important technologies early, translate successful demonstrations into operational capability, and provide the capital and customer opportunities needed to sustain them.

The success of Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy will ultimately be measured not by how many innovations it funds, but by how many become operational capabilities—and how many globally competitive Canadian companies it helps build.